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T HE 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure' (1983 amendments) represent by far the most ambi-
tious effort to date to remedy the widely perceived problem of
discovery abuse in federal practice. 2 These amendments are
designed to improve the conduct of discovery by eliminating im-
proper practices and making discovery more cost-effective for the
parties, and thereby helping the pretrial phase of an action to run
more smoothly. The 1983 discovery amendments have three ba-
sic thrusts: (1) active involvement by the court in the pretrial
phases of a case pursuant to rule 16; 3 (2) recognition of specific
1. The 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure include
changes to twelve rules. See FED. R. Civ. P. 6, 7, 11, 16, 26, 52, 67, 72-76. This
article will focus on the new rules as they affect the pretrial phase of a case, with
particular emphasis on discovery. For other discussions of the 1983 amend-
ments, see generally Evans, Strategy Under the New Rules, 10 LITIGATION 23 (1984);
Hall, New Rules Amendments Are Far Reaching, 69 A.B.A.J. 1640 (1983); Under-
wood, The New Federal Civil Procedure Rules; Greater Attorney Responsibility and More
Judicial Control, PRAC. LAw., Sept. 1, 1983, at 13; Ward, Amendments to Federal
Rules, 27 REs GESTAE 149 (1983); Comment, Deterring Dilatory Tactics in Litigation:
Proposed Amendments to Rules 7 and 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 895 (1982); Note, Recent Changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Prescriptions to Ease the Pain?, 15 TEX. TECH L. REV. 887 (1984).
2. In 1980, minor amendments were made to rules 26, 33, 34, 37 and 45,
but these changes proved ineffective in stemming the tide of discovery abuse.
See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the problem of
discovery abuse in federal practice, see infra notes 8-49 and accompanying text.
3. For a discussion of the changes to rule 16, see infra notes 63-92 and ac-
companying text.
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limitations on discovery under rule 26;4 and (3) mandatory sanc-
tions for misuse or overuse of discovery tools and use of baseless
motions to avoid proper discovery or to compel needless discov-
ery, 5 as well as discretionary sanctions for failure to participate in
good faith in pretrial conferences. 6
The key to the 1983 amendments is a heightened emphasis
on the use of sanctions to curb discovery abuse. The new rules
rely strongly on sanctions to effect a fundamental attitudinal
change by the practicing bar and the courts regarding the discov-
ery process. 7 An ideal discovery system would provide for broad
pretrial disclosure of facts at the lowest possible cost and would
minimize unnecessary judicial intervention. It is far from self-evi-
dent, however, that the 1983 amendments' introduction of the
mandatory sanctions concept will achieve the goals of the ideal
system or put an end to abusive discovery practices that have
been nurtured by attorneys for four and one-half decades. The
purpose of this article is threefold: (1) to summarize and analyze
the 1983 amendments as they relate to discovery; (2) to evaluate
the probable effectiveness of the new rules, particularly those re-
lating to sanctions, in remedying discovery abuse; and (3) to ex-
amine possible complementary or alternative approaches to
addressing effectively the problems of discovery abuse, focusing
specifically on the discovery reforms implemented in the Eastern
District of New York in March, 1984.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Root of the Discovery Abuse Problem
Much has been written in recent years about the problems of
discovery abuse in the federal system.8 Discovery abuse is the
4. For a discussion of the changes to rule 26, see infra notes 93-113 and
accompanying text.
5. For a discussion of the mandatory sanctions for discovery abuse under
rule 26(g), see infra notes 106-25 and accompanying text.
6. For a discussion of the discretionary sanctions for misconduct in the pre-
trial conference process under rule 16(f), see infra notes 90-92 and accompany-
ing text.
7. For discussions of the sanctions under the new rules, see infra notes 90-
91 & 106-25 and accompanying text.
8. Available literature on discovery abuse in the federal system includes:
Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems and
Abuses, 1980 A.B.A. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 787 (abuse of discovery is especially
burdensome and costly in large cases; failure to distribute relevant information
to all parties occurs at least 50% of the time); Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.- A
Need for Systematic Anticipation, 70 F.R.D. 83 (1976) (misuse and overuse of pre-
trial procedures constitute "areas of concern" that require "fundamental
7691985]
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misuse or overuse of the discovery process to gain an unfair tacti-
cal advantage over an adversary. 9 It is to be distinguished from
the intended purpose of discovery: to uncover facts underlying
the merits of an opponent's claims and defenses and thereby to
promote the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action."' 0 There is a widespread perception among judges,
scholars, practicing attorneys and clients that discovery has been
misused and overused by plaintiffs and defendants alike.' The
changes and major overhaul rather than simply 'tinkering' "); Kirkham, Complex
Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone Awry?, 70 F.R.D. 199,203 (1976) (abuse
of discovery burdens courts and parties, and threatens ability of legal system to
"achieve justice by rational means"); Liman, The Quantum of Discovery vs. the Qual-
ity of Justice: More is Less, 4 LITIGATION 8 (1977) (overuse of system in complex
cases renders discovery more an obstacle than a means to a just and efficient
determination); Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, 70 F.R.D. 96
(1976) (suggesting that showing of "probable merit" be prerequisite to discov-
ery so as to discourage actions based on hopes that discovery will reveal claim);
Rosenberg & King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough is Enough,
1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 579, 592 (noting widespread criticism of expense and bur-
den of discovery process brought about by "excesses of redundancy and dispro-
portionality"); Report of the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse, 92
F.R.D. 149 (1977) (proposing amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to curb perceived abuse of discovery process) [hereinafter cited as ABA Report];
Second Report of the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse, 92 F.R.D. 137,
138 (1980) (abuse of discovery is serious problem due to "trend toward increas-
ingly expensive, time consuming and vexatious use of the discovery rules")
[hereinafter cited as ABA Second Report]; Sofaer, Sanctioning Attorneys for Discovery
Abuse Under the New Federal Rules: On the Limited Utility of Punishment, 57 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 680 (1983) (excessive and abusive discovery has become major problem
in federal practice); Discovery in Civil Antitrust Suits, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (1975)
(symposium focusing on discovery problems in federal antitrust litigation).
9. See C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 81, at 542 (4th ed. 1983)
(discovery abuse includes both misuse-direct violation of rules, giving obvi-
ously inadequate responses, and requesting information clearly outside the
scope of discovery-and overuse-requesting more discovery than necessary or
appropriate); Cohn, Federal Discovery: A Survey of Local Rules and Practices in View of
Proposed Changes to the Federal Rules, 63 MINN. L. REV. 253, 255 (1979) (discovery
abuse includes both use of extensive pretrial proceedings to wear down finan-
cially weaker litigants as well as "fishing expeditions" in search of additional
claims); Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 264,
267-71 (1979) (discovery abuse includes false representations as to the existence
of documents, unreasonable discovery demands, and opposition to reasonable
discovery demands).
10. FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
11. See supra note 8. For examples of cases recognizing the problem of dis-
covery abuse, see Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (district courts
should restrict discovery as necessary to protect libel defendants from exces-
sively burdensome inquiries into state of mind and editorial processes); ACF
Indus., Inc. v. EEOC, 439 U.S. 1081, 1085-88 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(sanction of dismissal must be available to punish and deter severe discovery
abuse); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975) (po-
tential for discovery abuse is especially high in antitrust cases); In re Sealed Case
737 F.2d 94, (D.C. Cir. 1984) (perjury and document destruction were severe
misconduct, not "mere" discovery abuse as characterized by offending party's
770 [Vol. 30: p. 767
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result has been delay in the resolution of claims and defenses,
clogged dockets and increased litigation expenses.
However, while clients and courts have suffered, the litigat-
ing bar has clearly benefitted. Attorneys have had two very signif-
icant incentives to abuse discovery. First, since over ninety
percent of the civil cases in the federal system settle or are other-
wise disposed of prior to trial, 12 pretrial discovery is where liti-
gators earn the bulk of their fees.' 3 Second, ethical norms, which
require the attorney to represent his client zealously, encourage
the attorney to err on the side of caution. Thus, overuse and per-
haps misuse to obtain every advantage for the client is seen as an
imperative of the profession. 14 Given these realities, discovery
has become a self-contained universe with a life of its own, rather
than, as intended, a tool for facilitating litigation. As the eminent
procedural scholar Arthur Miller has noted, discovery in the fed-
eral courts is not unlike the dance marathons of another era
wherein the object was to hold onto your partner and wander
aimlessly about the dance floor for as long as possible.' 5
The problems we are facing today with respect to discovery
arose from the philosophy embraced by the original drafters of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' 6 Broad pretrial disclosure
counsel); Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150
(7th Cir. 1984) (discovery of sensitive documents is sometimes used to coerce
adverse party to settle case), rev'd on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 1327 (1985).
12. Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 1983
ANNUAL REPORT 273, Table C-4.
13. See Lewin, A Plan to Limit Pretrial Work, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1982, at D2,
col. 1; Rosenberg & King, supra note 8, at 589.
14. Canon 7 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "a
lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the law." MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1979). See also Renfrew, supra
note 9, at 274 (use of discovery sanctions are likely to have chilling effect on the
attorney's duty to represent his client zealously).
15. Miller & Culp, Litigation Costs, Delay Prompted by the New Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, NAT. L.J., Nov. 28, 1983, at 24, col. 3. The authors also take the position
that the reform efforts' focus on litigation was misplaced, as over 90% of federal
cases never go to trial. Id. They suggest that the key to reform is the discovery
period, the period between initiation of the suit and trial. Id.
16. The underlying philosophy of the rules is that a meritorious claimant
ought to have his day in court. This philosophy is evidenced by, among other
things, the simplification of formerly complex technical pleading rules. See C.
WRIGHT, supra note 9, § 68, at 438-39. The drafters sought to simplify the
mechanics of pleading to avoid dismissal of meritorious claims for failure to
comply with complex and esoteric pleading requirements. Id. Thus, under the
rules, a complaint normally need contain only a "short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
Functions that traditionally had been performed by pleadings, such as narrowing
of issues and disposing of sham claims and defenses, are now handled through
other pretrial mechanisms. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 9, § 91, at 601.
1985]
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was the "Cinderella of changes" under the rules.' 7 Traditionally,
little outside the pleadings was disclosed prior to trial. The trial
itself was more a battle of wits than a search for truth, with victory
going to the party with the more clever advocate.' 8 The drafters
of the Federal Rules adopted the view that the search for truth
would be best effectuated where the parties have the "fullest pos-
sible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial."' 19 Discovery
rules were drafted to make certain that trial was "less a game of
blindman's bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and
facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent." 20 To be sure
that both sides would have the fullest possible knowledge of the
issues, the rules provided for broad pretrial discovery to permit
discovery of "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action."' 2 ' Moreover, dis-
covery was not limited to admissible evidence. Instead, any mat-
ter which "appeared reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence" was discoverable.2 2 Full disclo-
sure was the operative goal, with the trial of a case to be little
more than the organized presentation of information gained in
discovery. 23
17. C. WRIGHT, supra note 9, § 81, at 539. Wright notes, however, that
"there are those who are saying that the carriage has turned into a pumpkin, and
that major changes are needed if it is to be a carriage again." Id. The discovery
rules were a significant and highly innovative change in civil procedure, but ex-
perience revealed the potential for abuse and the fact that the rules would have
to be extensively amended if they were to fulfill their original purpose. Id. at
540.
18. See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1962) ("The Federal Rules
reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by
counsel may be decisive of the outcome .... ); Koster v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 93 F.R.D. 471, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (under old system, litigants often
learned their adversaries' case in the courtroom); see also Cohn, supra note 9 at
253. The rules soundly rejected this so-called "sporting theory" ofjustice. 8 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2001, at 14 (1970).
19. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) (following adoption of the
rules, civil trials in federal court no longer are "carried on in the dark").
20. United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958).
21. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). For an excerpt of the text of rule 26(b)(1), see
infra note 103.
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
23. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Shelak v. White Motor Co.,
581 F.2d 1155, 1159 (5th Cir. 1978) (federal rules designed to give parties
knowledge of facts and to prevent surprise); Marron v. H.O. Penn Mach. Co.,
518 F. Supp. 1069, 1073 (D. Conn. 1981) (counsel reprimanded for failing to
disclose evidence and thereby frustrating the design of rules to avoid "trial by
ambush").
772 [Vol. 30: p. 767
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B. Discovery Abuse and the Bar
The goals of the original drafters were admirable, 24 but their
attainment has proven to be elusive. The rules were drafted with
a broad brush and were not designed to provide the details of
what constitutes acceptable conduct by attorneys' discovery.
Such details were to be worked out at the local rulemaking level
based on the practical experience of attorneys and the courts.25
Nevertheless, because neither the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure nor the various local rules dealt with every conceivable dis-
pute that might arise, gray areas inevitably emerged. Indeed, in
the nearly half century that the Federal Rules have been in effect,
a number of practices have arisen that are neither expressly ap-
proved nor expressly prohibited by the rules. For example,
although the rules mandate broad disclosure and provide that
pretrial testimony shall be taken subject to objections, 26 it is gen-
erally accepted that a witness on deposition may decline to an-
swer a question calling for privileged information. 27 In some
districts, notwithstanding the silence of the rules, it is established
practice to permit an attorney to direct a witness not to answer
questions propounded at a deposition on grounds other than
privilege. 28 Such grounds might include the fact that the exam-
iner is abusive or that the questions are irrelevant. 29 Precisely be-
24. Not all commentators agree that the goals of the drafters were admira-
ble. See Liman, supra note 8, at 8 (the goal of securing the "just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action," expressed in rule 1, "seems pure
Pollyanna").
25. Rule 83 authorizes local district courts to make rules regulating their
practice "in any manner not inconsistent with these rules." FED. R. Civ. P. 83.
The Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference
of the United States had circulated a draft amendment to rule 83 that would
have attempted to enhance local rulemaking by providing for notice of proposed
changes, comment periods, and experimental local rulemaking. COMMITrEE ON
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THEJUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Aug. 22, 1983) (committee note to proposed rule 83).
That proposal, however, has since been withdrawn.
26. See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c) (testimony at a deposition should be taken sub-
ject to objections to "the qualifications of the officer taking the deposition, or to
the manner of taking it, or to the evidence presented, or to the conduct of any
party").
27. See, e.g., Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 85 F.R.D. 731, 733 (N.D. I11.
1980) (deponent must answer questions unless he can claim a privilege); Preyer
v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 430, 431 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (deponent must answer
questions objected to as irrelevant, but not those involving a claim of privilege),
aff'd, 546 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1976).
28. See infra note 29.
29. See, e.g., Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No.
130, 657 F.2d 890, 903 (7th Cir. 1981) (some irrelevant questions go "beyond
7731985]
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cause the rules set forth no firm boundaries, discovery practice
has been corrupted by those attorneys who have misused or over-
used pretrial disclosure devices to take unfair advantage of their
adversaries.
Thus, discovery may be used as a device for forcing the quick
settlement of a tenuous claim. 30 Likewise, it may be employed by
well-heeled defendants as part of a "scorched earth" policy
designed to force a plaintiff's capitulation before getting to the
merits. 3' Moreover, a party may deplete its adversary's resources
by refusing to cooperate in discovery and forcing the other party
to seek judicial intervention to obtain even the most basic disclo-
sure. While rule 37 makes such abusive tactics punishable, 32 the
reluctance of many judges to impose sanctions has resulted in
such misconduct going unpunished for the most part.33
reasonable limits"); International Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers, v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 91 F.R.D. 277, 280 n.5 (D.D.C. 1981) (witnesses
might not be required to answer entirely irrelevant questions when answering
would result in some harm, as when question was directed at sensitive part of
witness' past). But see Shapiro v. Freeman, 38 F.R.D. 308, 311-12 (S.D.N.Y.
1965) (objection at deposition on grounds of irrelevancy does not warrant in-
struction not to answer); 4AJ. MOORE, J. LUCAS & D. EPSTEIN MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE $ 37.02[2] (2d ed. 1984) (although rule 26(c) permits courts to limit in
advance the scope of deposition, courts are unlikely to do so given broad discov-
ery permitted under the rules).
30. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975)
(plaintiff with largely groundless claim may use discovery to force settlement);
Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d 1150, 1161
(7th Cir. 1984) (discovery of sensitive documents may be used to force opponent
to settle where opponent would rather settle than produce documents, regard-
less of merits of case), rev'd on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 1327 (1985).
31. See Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 540 F. Supp. 706, 731 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (defendant moved for expedited trial after Chrysler had conducted four
years of discovery utilizing tactics that illustrated "how a modern litigant can
wage unlimited guerilla war").
32. Rule 37 provides for a variety of sanctions or controls over discovery
abuse. It allows a party to make a motion to compel discovery if his opponent is
not cooperating in the discovery process. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2). Depending
on the circumstances, the court may require the party whose conduct necessi-
tated the motion to pay the moving party's reasonable expenses, or it may re-
quire the moving party to pay the other party's expenses incurred in opposing
the motion. Id. Failure to comply with a court order regarding discovery may
result in a party being held in contempt of court. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(1). If a
party requests an admission under rule 36, and the opposing party refuses to
admit to the truth of the matter requested, the opposing party may be required
to pay expenses incurred if the requesting party later establishes its truthfulness.
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(d), (g). It should be emphasized, however, that imposition of
these sanctions is within the discretion of the court.
33. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 18, § 2284, at 771-72 (imposi-
tion of sanctions under rule 37 is relatively rare occurrence); Renfrew, supra note
9, at 271-72 (fundamental cause of underutilization of sanctions is courts' reluc-
tance to use them); Sofaer, supra note 8, at 703-04 (sanctions are rarely sought
[Vol. 30: p. 767
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C. The Courts And Discovery
It would be a serious mistake to lay the entire responsibility
for problems encountered in discovery on the shoulders of the
litigants and their attorneys. The federal judiciary must share at
least some of the blame. As initially conceived by the drafters of
the rules, discovery was to be largely self-regulating. 34 The sweep
of discovery was so broad that judicial intervention would rarely
be necessary, except to determine (1) whether privilege attached,
thus placing the information sought beyond the scope of discov-
ery;3 5 (2) whether a request was "reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence"; 36 (3) whether a party
ought to be compelled to provide discovery;37 and (4) whether a
party had disobeyed a court order requiring discovery.38
However, experience has proven that discovery does not al-
and frequently not ruled upon even when rule 37 motion to compel discovery is
granted).
34. The view that discovery is to be self-regulating was made explicit by the
drafters of the 1970 amendments to the rules, who commented that "the
mechanics of discovery are designed to encourage extrajudicial discovery with a
minimum of court intervention." PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RELATING TO DISCOVERY, 48 F.R.D. 485, 488 (1970).
See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 357 n.24 (1978) (discov-
ery rules contemplate proceeding without judicial intervention unless a party so
moves). See generally P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN & M. KOHLMAN, JUDICIAL CON-
TROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY 9-10 (1978) (observing a
growing trend toward restricting role of judiciary in discovery process); Kauf-
man,Judicial Control Over Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 111, 116 (1961) (private accommo-
dation by litigants, not judicial intervention, should control discovery process);
Sherman & Kinard, Federal Court Discovery in the 80's-Making the Rules Work, 95
F.R.D. 245, 269 (1982) (judicial intervention unnecessary to accomplish distri-
bution of information in discovery).
Initially, the rules limited parties in the discovery process to serving one set
of interrogatories. FED. R. Civ. P. 33, 308 U.S. 707 (1938). That restriction was
lifted by an amendment in 1946. 28 U.S.C. app., at 591 (1982) (note of Advisory
Committee on Rules-1946 Amendments). Prior to 1970, parties could not
make document requests under rule 34 without a court order, but the 1970
amendments eliminated that requirement. Id. at 594 (note of Advisory Commit-
tee on Rules-1970 Amendments). Under current law, a court order is required
only for mental or physical examinations sought under rule 35. FED. R. Civ. P.
35. As discovery has evolved, attorneys have been given "virtually unlimited
discretion over the initiation of discovery .nd the enforcement of discovery
rights." P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN & M. KOHLMAN, supra, at 9-10.
35. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). For a discussion of rule 26(b)(1) see infra
notes 97-105 and accompanying text. For a discussion of privilege as grounds
for refusing to answer a question in a deposition, see supra note 27 and accom-
panying text.
36. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
37. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a). For a discussion of the provisions of rule
37(a), see supra note 32.
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b).
9
Cavanagh: The August 1, 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
ways proceed harmoniously. The courts therefore, cannot sit idly
on the sidelines during the pretrial phase of the case. Sometimes,
the parties or their attorneys simply do not get along and cannot
resolve even the most insignificant discovery disputes without ju-
dicial intervention. Even where the parties conscientiously seek
to settle their difference outside of court, judicial intervention
may become necessary because the dispute is indeed significant
and unresolvable without an arbiter. In such cases, discovery may
grind to a halt unless the court steps in to break the impasse.
Moreover, judicial intervention is necessary at times to set
the limits of acceptable conduct by attorneys and thereby keep
the law of the jungle from governing discovery.3 9 As noted
above, in the half century that the rules have been in effect, a
number of practices have arisen that are neither expressly ap-
proved nor expressly prohibited by the rules.40 In such cases, the
onus falls upon the courts to develop practical and workable dis-
covery procedures which are consistent with the spirit of the Fed-
eral Rules.
Unfortunately, district judges have been less than eager to
involve themselves intimately in the interstices of discovery mat-
ters.41 This is not surprising, given the heavy case loads that dis-
trict judges now carry and given the fact that many judges view
their primary responsibilities to be trying cases and resolving dis-
positive motions. Judges are only too happy to refer all discovery
matters to magistrates or special masters, or simply to defer con-
sideration of discovery motions in the somewhat unrealistic hope
that the parties eventually will resolve the matter themselves.4
2
39. For a discussion of discovery abuse, intimidation, "scorched earth" tac-
tics, and other conduct by attorneys in the discovery process, see supra notes 24-
33 and accompanying text.
40. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
41. In a leading empirical study on discovery, professor Wayne D. Brazil
found that attorneys were angry and disappointed over the way judges handled
discovery. Brazil, Views From the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About
the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 A.B.A. FOUND. RESEARCHJ. 219, 245-49. Brazil's
study disclosed that attorneys felt that judges had negative attitudes toward dis-
covery disputes and that many judges appeared to feel that discovery disputes
did not belong in court. Id. Attorneys felt that judges were reluctant to commit
the time and resources necessary to resolve discovery disputes and that they
were too lenient in punishing discovery abuse. Id. For a general discussion of
the courts' reluctance to impose available sanctions, see supra note 33 and ac-
companying text.
42. The Brazil study indicates that the assumption that the parties can
"work things out" is often naive, as discovery disputes frequently involve real
controversies that only can be resolved in court. See Brazil, supra note 41, at 245-
49. But see supra note 34 and accompanying text (intent of drafters was that dis-
covery would proceed without judicial intervention).
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The nitty-gritty of discovery work is itself quite distasteful
and may require the judge to review lengthy and detailed inter-
rogatories or document requests, as well as equally lengthy and
often highly technical objections thereto. For a judge fully famil-
iar with the case, deciding such a discovery motion may prove ar-
duous; but for the judge who has little knowledge of the case, the
task is overwhelming. Nevertheless, the mere fact that the work is
distasteful should not be a sufficient justification for not doing it.
Unquestionably, many judges could be more diligent in making
discovery rulings.43 Indeed, the more promptly a ruling is made,
the more quickly procedural logjams can be resolved.
Lack of diligence, however, is not the only shortcoming of
judicial handling of discovery. Frequently, there is a lack of uni-
formity of discovery motion practice among judges in the same
district, with many judges establishing, formally or informally,
their own "personal" rules.44 Some judges insist that all discov-
ery motions be fully briefed and argued, with motion, response
and reply papers to be filed with the court.45 Other judges will
entertain motion papers only after an in-court personal appear-
ance by the attorneys.46 Still others may not permit submission of
written papers at all.47 This proliferation of individualized rules
tends to create confusion among practitioners and contributes
significantly to delay in the hearing and determination of discov-
ery motions.
Apart from the procedural quagmire created by individual-
ized rules, judges frequently frustrate the parties and the discov-
ery process by inordinate delay in deciding discovery disputes. 48
Once it is clear that the parties have reached an impasse on dis-
43. See Brazil, supra note 41, at 245-49.
44. The New York Law Journal regularly publishes the individual rules of fed-
eral judges in the Southern District of New York, which illustrate the variety of
rules within one district. See, e.g., N.Y.L.J., March 18, 1985, at 26, col. 5; id.
March 11, 1985, at 25, col. 5.
45. Id., March 18, 1985, at 26, col. 7.
46. Id.
47. Id., March 11, 1985, at 25, col. 7.
48. See Revised Report of the Special Committee on Effective Discovery in Civil Cases
for the Eastern District of New York to the Honorable Jack B. Weinstein, ChiefJudge, 102
F.R.D. 357, 371 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Eastern District Revised Report]. This
report noted that
[a] major criticism which has been levelled by the practicing bar is the
judicial system's failure to determine discovery disputes promptly and
decisively, thereby causing delays and additional expense to the parties.
Prompt resolution of discovery issues minimizes wasted time, lessens
needless acrimony between the parties, and enables attorneys to get on
with the pretrial process in an expeditious manner.
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covery, and that judicial intervention is necessary, it is in the best
interest of all concerned to have the dispute resolved expedi-
tiously so that the matter may proceed. In some cases, delay by
the court may be a conscious tactic to force the parties to resolve
the problem themselves. This approach, however, seldom
works. 49 More often, the delay is caused by the court's reluctance
to involve itself in the drudgery of discovery practice. Certainly,
deciding discovery motions is neither the most desirable nor the
most scholarly task judges are asked to perform. Nevertheless, it
is the court's responsibility to resolve such matters.
II. 1983 AMENDMENTS To THE FEDERAL RULES
While much has been written about the problems of discov-
ery abuse, very little has been done to remedy the malady. In
1976, at the now famous Pound Conference, the profession be-
gan to take a hard look at ways to improve the American system of
justice, including the operation of pretrial discovery. 50 The
Pound Conference led to the formation of an American Bar Asso-
ciation committee (ABA Special Committee) to examine the prob-
lem of discovery abuse.51 The ABA Special Committee issued a
detailed report recommending significant changes in the discov-
ery area.5 2 The Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules (Advisory Committee), however, chose not to endorse
49. Id. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
50. On April 7-9, 1976, the National Conference on the Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, known as the Pound Confer-
ence, took place in St. Paul, Minnesota. Its participants included the ChiefJus-
tice of the Supreme Court of the United States, leaders in the federal judiciary,
chiefjustices of the highest state courts, leading trial attorneys and legal schol-
ars. A major item on the agenda was the discovery process in the federal system.
See Addresses Delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice, 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976).
51. Report of Pound Conference Follow-up Task Force, 74 F.R.D. 159, 165 (1976).
The American Bar Foundation formed the task force "to assure that the ideas
presented at the Pound Conference would be carefully considered by those or-
ganizations or agencies best able to evaluate and implement them." Id. The
task force identified discovery abuse as a significant concern of the conference
participants. Id. at 171. Following the issuance of the task force report, the Liti-
gation Section of the American Bar Association formed a Special Committee for
the Study of Discovery Abuse (Special Committee). See ABA Report, supra note 8.
In the fall of 1977, the ABA Special Committee issued a draft report recom-
mending certain amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id.
The draft was circulated for comment and a revised report was subsequently
issued. See ABA Second Report, supra note 8.
52. See ABA Second Report, supra note 8.
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such sweeping changes. 53 Finding that discovery abuse was not
so pervasive as to require fundamental changes in discovery in all
cases, the Advisory Committee proposed instead only modest
amendments to the Federal Rules. These amendments became
effective on August 1, 1980.54
The 1980 amendments sought to address the problem of dis-
covery abuse by providing for a discovery conference early on in
the litigation. 55 The amendments also sought to remedy specific
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) advisory committee note (citing P. CONNOLLY, E.
HOLLEMAN & M. KUHLMAN, supra note 34, at 85).
54. The Advisory Committee originally had issued a preliminary draft of
proposed amendments which reflected the ABA Special Committee's recom-
mendations for significant changes in the rules. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 77 F.R.D. 613 (1978). However,
after circulation for public comment, a revised draft that recommended fewer
sweeping changes was issued. See Revised Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 80 F.R.D. 323 (1979). It is particularly note-
worthy that the Advisory Committee, in its final draft, rejected the ABA Special
Committee's recommendation that the scope of discovery be limited to "any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the issues raised by the claims or
defenses of any party." ABA Report, supra note 8, at 157. The final draft of the
Advisory Committee was promulgated by the United States Supreme Court and
became effective on August 1, 1980. See Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 446 U.S. 995 (1980).
55. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f). Subsection (0 was a new addition to rule 26
under the 1980 amendments. It was designed to allow a party who sought, but
had not received, the cooperation of an opposing party in effecting a plan for
discovery to seek the assistance of the court. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) advisory com-
mittee note. Rule 26(f) provides:
(f) Discovery Conference. At any time after commencement of an ac-
tion the court may direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before
it for a conference on the subject of discovery. The court shall do so
upon motion by the attorney for any party if the motion includes:
(1) A statement of the issues as they then appear;
(2) A proposed plan and schedule of discovery;
(3) Any limitations proposed to be placed on discovery;
(4) Any other proposed orders with respect to discovery; and
(5) A statement showing that the attorney making the motion has
made a reasonable effort to reach agreement with opposing
attorneys on the matters set forth in the motion. Each party
and his attorney are under a duty to participate in good faith
in the framing of a discovery plan if a plan is proposed by the
attorney for any party. Notice of the motion shall be served
on all parties.
Objections or additions to matters set forth in the motion
shall be served not later than ten days after service of the
motion.
Following the discovery conference, the court shall enter an
order tentatively identifying the issues for discovery purposes,
establishing a plan and schedule for discovery, setting limita-
tions on discovery, if any; and determining such other mat-
ters, including the allocation of expenses, as are necessary for
the proper management of discovery in the action. An order
may be altered or amended whenever justice so requires.
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abuses relating to the manner in which parties responded to in-
terrogatories and document requests. 56 Significantly, Justice
Powell joined by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, dissented from
the Supreme Court Order promulgating the 1980 amendments
on the grounds that they were wholly inadequate to deal with the
widespread problems of discovery abuse.57 Justice Powell proved
prophetic. The 1980 amendments did little to stem the rising tide
of discovery abuse because they did not address the underlying
causes. The stage was thus set for the 1983 amendments.
Subject to the right of a party who properly moves for a dis-
covery conference to prompt convening of the conference,
the court may combine the discovery conference with a pre-
trial conference authorized by Rule 16.
56. With respect to responses to interrogatories, rule 33 was amended to
require that parties opting to produce pertinent business records in lieu of di-
rect answers provide the interrogating party with information as to where in the
records the answer can be found. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(c). This amendment was
designed to remedy a perceived abuse of the 33(c) option occurring when the
responding party would direct the interrogating party "to a mass of business
records" rather than simply answering the interrogatories. FED. R. Civ. P. 33(c)
advisory committee note.
With respect to document production requests, rule 34 was amended to
require responding parties to "produce [the requested documents] as they are
kept in the usual course of business" or to "organize and label [the requested
documents] to correspond with the categories in the request." FED. R. Civ. P.
34(b). This amendment was designed to remedy situations in which the re-
sponding party would "deliberately mix ... critical documents with many others
in order to obscure significance." FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b) advisory committee
note.
57. Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 54, at 997-
98 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell described the amendments as "tinker-
ing changes" which fell "short of those needed to accomplish reforms in civil
litigation that are long overdue." Id. at 998, 1000. Justice Powell went on to
state:
The American Bar Association proposed significant and substantial
reforms. Although the Standing Committee initially favored most of
these proposals, it ultimately rejected them in large part. The ABA
now accedes to the Standing Committee's amendments because they
make some improvements, but the most recent report of the ABA Sec-
tion of Litigation makes clear that the "serious and widespread abuse of
discovery" will remain largely uncontrolled. There are wide differences
of opinion within the profession as to the need for reform. The bench
and the bar are familiar with the existing Rules, and it often is said that
the bar has a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. I imply no
criticism of the bar or the Standing Committee when I suggest that the
present recommendations reflect a compromise as well as the difficulty
of framing satisfactory discovery Rules. But whatever considerations
may have prompted the Committee's final decision, I doubt that many
judges or lawyers familiar with the proposed amendments believe they
will have an appreciable effect on the acute problems associated with
discovery. The Court's adoption of these inadequate changes could
postpone effective reform for another decade.
Id. at 998 (footnotes omitted).
780 [Vol. 30: p. 767
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss3/3
FEDERAL RULES: 1983 AMENDMENTS
While the ABA Special Committee's sweeping proposals for
discovery reform were rejected in 1980, the ongoing work of that
committee met with approval in the profession. Ultimately the
Advisory Committee resurrected some of the ABA Special Com-
mittee's concepts in proposing the 1983 amendments. 58 It en-
dorsed the ABA proposals that had imposed a nondelegable duty
on lawyers to conduct discovery in good faith and had expressly
adopted a principle of proportionality in discovery. 59 It also pro-
posed that the frequency of use of discovery methods be limited
to ease the problem of excessive discovery. 60 In addition, the Ad-
visory Committee proposed major changes in rule 1661 and a sub-
stantial revision of the certification requirements of rules 7 and
11.62
A. Rule 16 Pretrial Conferences
Under the 1983 amendments, rule 16 has been rewritten
completely to encourage active judicial management of the pre-
trial phase of litigation by shifting the court's focus away from the
trial and toward judicial management of all pretrial matters. 63
The following discussion outlines the relevant provisions of new
rule 16.
58. For a brief encapsulation of the concepts incorporated into the rules
under the 1983 amendments, see Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure, 97
F.R.D. 165, 190-94 app. c (1983) (advisory committee's introductory letter sub-
mitting its proposed amendments to the rules). Cf Second Report, supra note 8, at
141-43.
59. 97 F.R.D. at 216-17. For a discussion of the obligation to conduct dis-
covery in good faith, see infra notes 106-13 and accompanying text. For a dis-
cussion of the introduction of the concept of proportionality, see infra notes
100-01 and accompanying text.
60. 97 F.R.D. at 214-15. For a discussion of the amendments' limitations
on excessive discovery, see infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
61. 97 F.R.D. at 201-05. For a discussion of the amendments' major
changes to rule 16, see infra notes 63-92 and accompanying text.
62. 97 F.R.D. at 196-97. For a discussion of the revisions of certification
procedures under rules 7 and 11, concerning certification of motions and plead-
ings respectively, see infra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee note. The Advisory Committee
observed:
Empirical studies reveal that when a trial judge intervenes personally at
an early stage to assume judicial control over a case and to schedule
dates for completion by the parties of the principal pretrial steps, the
case is disposed of by settlement or trial more efficiently and with less
cost and delay than when the parties are left to their own devices.
Id. (citing S. FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURTS 17 (1977)). As a result of these considerations, the
Advisory Committee redrafted rule 16 to facilitate early intervention by the trial
judge in pretrial management of the case.
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1. Mandatory Feature of Rule 16." The Scheduling Order
The only mandatory aspect of amended rule 16 is the re-
quirement in 16(b) that a scheduling order be entered within 120
days after the complaint is filed.6 4 The goal of the 120 day limit is
to "galvanize each judge into action" and start the case moving
toward adjudication. 65 Rule 16(b) provides that the scheduling
order shall limit the time (1) to join other parties and to amend
the pleadings; (2) to file and hear motions; and (3) to complete
discovery. The order also may include: (4) the date or dates for
conferences before trial, a final pretrial conference, and trial; and
(5) any other matters appropriate in the circumstances of the
case. 66 The rule provides that the order be entered after consul-
tation with attorneys for the parties or with any unrepresented
parties, but it does not specify the mode of such consultation.67
Since the new rule does not mandate an in-person conference, it
appears that consultation may be had by telephone, mail or other
appropriate forms of communication. 68
Significantly, the drafters recognized that a scheduling order
may not be necessary in every case and that to so require could
further tax attorneys, their clients and an already overburdened
judiciary. Rule 16(b), therefore, empowers each district by local
rule to exempt certain categories of cases from the scheduling or-
der requirement where the burdens imposed by the scheduling
order would outweigh the efficiencies derived therefrom. 69 Some
districts have already exercised this option. 70
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b). With respect to the timing of the order, rule
16(b) provides:
The [scheduling] order shall issue as soon as practicable but in no
event more than 120 days after filing of the complaint. A schedule shall
not be modified except by leave of the judge or a magistrate when au-
thorized by district court rule upon a showing of good cause.
Id.
65. Miller & Culp. The New Rules of Civil Procedure: Managing Cases, Limited
Discovery, NAT. L.J. Dec. 5, 1983, at 24, col. 1. Judicial involvement at an early
stage is a "desirable tool in reducing the time between institution and pretrial
termination" and preordained deadlines are likely to reduce chances of slippage
in the trial date. Id. at 23, col. 3.
66. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b).
67. See id.
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) advisory committee note.
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b). The Advisory Committee notes to rule 16(b) sug-
gest that such cases might include social security disability matters, habeas
corpus petitions, forfeitures and reviews of various administrative actions. FED.
R. Civ. P. 16(b) advisory committee note.
70. See, e.g., E.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 45 ("Matters involving habeas corpus peti-
tions, social security disability cases, motions to vacate sentences, forfeitures,
and reviews from administrative agencies are exempted from the mandatory
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2. Agenda for Pretrial Conferences
Amended rule 16(c) expands upon the topics which may be
covered at the pretrial conference in order to encourage better
planning and more effective management of the litigation, and
thereby allow for more rapid disposition of cases. 7' The follow-
ing is a list of the expanded topics contemplated by the
amendments:
a. New rule 16(c)(1) broadens its predecessor by making
clear that pretrial conferences can be used to formulate as well as
to simplify issues. 72 The addition of the term "formulate" is sig-
nificant because, in certain complex cases, issues cannot even be
shaped until there has been some initial discovery. 73 As amended,
rule 16(c)(1) also permits the court to dispose of frivolous claims
or defenses at the pretrial conference without first having to en-
tertain formal motion papers.74
b. Amended rule 16 expands old rule 16(c)(3) by providing
that the pretrial agenda may include not only discussion of admis-
sions relating to facts and authenticity of documents, but also dis-
cussion of the feasibility of stipulations regarding documentary
evidence and of the practicality of obtaining advance rulings on
evidentiary matters. 75 Additionally, the court is encouraged to
discuss ways to avoid unnecessary or cumulative proof,76 to iden-
tify witnesses and documents to be offered as proof,77 and to set
scheduling order required by Rule 16(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.")..
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c) advisory committee note. In articulating their
goals in expanding 16(c), the Advisory Committee stated that the new rule was
intended "to encourage better planning and management of litigation." Id.
The Committee observed that "[i]ncreased judicial control during the pretrial
period accelerates the processing and termination of cases." Id. (citing S. FLAN-
DERS, supra note 63; Report to the President and the Attorney General of the National
Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures (Jan. 22, 1979)).
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(1) (participants at any pretrial conference may
consider "the formulation and simplification of the issues, including the elimina-
tion of frivolous claims or defenses").
73. See Miller & Culp, supra note 65, at 24 (reference to "formulation" of
issues is designed to foster defining of issues early in litigation).
74. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(1).
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(3). Rule 16(c)(3) provides that the following may
be discussed at any pretrial conference:
the possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which
will avoid unnecessary proof, stipulations regarding the authenticity of
documents, and advance rulings from the court on the admissibility of
evidence.
Id.
76. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(4).
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(5).
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forth a schedule for exchange of pretrial briefs and future
conferences. 78
c. In recognition of the expanded role of magistrates in pre-
trial proceedings, 79 the amended rule provides for consideration
of reference to a magistrate or master at the pretrial conference.
80
d. Amended rule 16 explicitly endorses the propriety of dis-
cussing settlement at pretrial conferences. 8' Settlement is an es-
pecially appropriate topic for discussion at pretrial conferences.
The sooner settlement negotiations begin, the greater the likeli-
hood of early disposition, thus allowing parties to realize savings
in attorneys' fees and court costs. Perhaps more importantly, the
amended rule encourages the parties to consider whether their
disagreement is better resolved by resort to alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms rather than to the courtroom.8 2 For ex-
ample, where the action involves highly technical or complex is-
sues, arbitration or the minitrial procedures may be a more fitting
mechanism for dispute resolution than the traditional trial.83
e. Newly added provisions encourage the court and the par-
ties to investigate the need for, and use of, special procedures in
complex litigation.8 4 The court, to facilitate discovery, may pre-
78. Id.
79. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(6) advisory committee note (acknowledging
"the widespread availability and use of magistrates"). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 72
(magistrate to promptly hear and determine pretrial matters referred to him); 28
U.S.C. ** 631-39 (1982) (providing for appointment, service, jurisdiction and
powers of United States Magistrates).
80. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(6).
81. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7). This subsection, permitting discussion of set-
tlement at any pretrial conference, was not designed to impose settlement on
unwilling parties, but rather to provide a neutral forum for conciliatory talks.
FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7) advisory committee note. While the drafters considered
placing limits on judicial involvement in settlement discussion, the 1983 amend-
ments do not address thequestion of specific procedures to be followed in set-
tlement discussions. Miller & Culp, supra note 65, at 24, col. 2.
82. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7).
83. For a discussion of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, see gen-
erally, Perritt, "And the Whole World Was of One Language" A Broad View of Dispute
Resolution, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1221, 1286-91 (1984) (discussing the roles discovery
and pretrial conferences play in improving party assessment of trial outcome,
which facilitates settlement); Lambros, The Judge's Role in Fostering Voluntary Settle-
ments, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1363, 1373-78 (1984) (discussing the nature and effect of
the summary trial procedure); Harter, Dispute Resolution and Administrative Law:
The History, Needs, and Future of a Complex Relationship, 29 VILL. L. REV. 1393,
1412-13 (1984) (discussing arbitration as one of several techniques available in
lieu of traditional forms of agency adjudication).
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(10). The rule identifies "complex issues, multiple
parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof problems" as features of a
given case that might make it a candidate for special treatment. Id. The drafters
did not specify any particular techniques for handling these complex cases, but
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scribe the order and subject matter of depositions or direct the
order in which various discovery tools are to be used.85
The procedures incorporated in the rule 16 amendments are
neither new nor radical. Indeed, a number of judges in the fed-
eral system have been employing such procedures for many
years. 86 The amended rule simply makes active judicial involve-
ment a routine part of all pretrial procedures. 87
3. Protocol at Pretrial Conferences
The last sentence of the new rule 16(c) requires that attor-
neys be prepared to participate in the pretrial conference in a
meaningful way and that those attending the pretrial conference
have authority to enter into stipulations and to make admissions
rather referred to outside authorities for suggestion. See FED. R. Civ. P.
16(c)(10) advisory committee note (citing FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (1978); Kendig, Procedures for Management of Non-Routine
Cases, 3 HOFSTRA L. REV. 701 (1975); Rubin, The Managed Calendar: Some Prag-
matic Suggestions About Achieving the Just, Speedy and Inexpensive Determination of Civil
Cases in Federal Courts, 4 JUST. SYs. J. 135 (1976)).
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b).
86. Judge Edward R. Becker, now sitting on the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, used many of the techniques adopted in the new rule 16 in handling com-
plex litigation as a trial judge in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See, e.g., In
rejapanese Elect. Prods. Antitrust Litigation, 478 F. Supp. 889, 946-60 (E.D. Pa.
1979) (use of pretrial discovery order and timetable in a complex antitrust case)
afd in part and rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. granted in part, 53
U.S.L.W. 3702 (Apr. 1, 1985). Judge Becker has advocated "[e]arly and active
and ongoing case management, strong case management" on the part of the
trial judge as the key to effective handling of complex cases. Addressing the
Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association in 1982, Judge Becker empha-
sized his conviction that "the judge must get into the case from day one, under-
stand the case, understand the issues, be a partner in fashioning the
development of the case substantively as well as procedurally, manage[] through
the vehicle of periodic and frequent pretrial conferences." Becker, Expediting and
Controlling Antitrust Litigation-The Demand for Cost Containment, 51 ANTITRUST L.J.
437, 440 (1982).
Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
has endorsed similar case management techniques in complex cases. See, Hig-
ginbotham, Discovery Management Considerations in Antitrust Cases, 51 ANTITRUST
L.J. 231, 234 (1982) (emphasizing that complex cases should be controlled
through judicial intervention from the beginning).
Judge William W. Schwarzer of the Northern District of California likewise
has been a strong advocate of the case management techniques adopted in the
new rule 16. See Schwarzer, Techniques for Identifying and Narrowing Issues in Anti-
trust Cases, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 223, 225-26 (1982) (discovery should clarify issues,
not merely disgorge facts). See generally W. SCHWARZER, MANAGING ANTITRUST
AND OTHER COMPLEX LITIGATION: A HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES
(1982).
87. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee note (the goal of the new rule is
"judicial management that embraces the entire pretrial phase, especially mo-
tions and discovery").
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regarding all matters that the participants might reasonably antic-
ipate will arise.88 This is designed to cure a common abuse of
sending to pretrial conferences junior attorneys who have no au-
thority to make binding decisions.8 9 Such practices seriously un-
dermined the usefulness of the pretrial conferences. Ideally, the
attorney who will try the case will regularly attend pretrial
conferences.
4. Sanctions: Rule 16(f)
Failure to comply with rule 16 may result in the imposition of
sanctions on the noncomplying parties. 90 Rule 16(f) incorporates
portions of rule 37(b)(2), which prescribes sanctions for failure to
provide discovery. 9' Sanctions under rule 37(b) may include a
preclusion order, striking of a pleading, staying of a proceeding,
default, contempt, or an award of attorneys' fees incurred by the
opposing party as a result of noncompliance. 9
2
B. Rule 26
The second major thrust of the 1983 amendments is their
recognition that the right of pretrial disclosure is subject to some
limitation beyond relevance. 93 Rule 26(a) had heretofore pro-
88. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c).
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee note. The drafters observed that
a major criticism of the pretrial conference procedure prior to the amendments
was that the conferences tended to be "ceremonial and ritualistic, having little
effect on the trial and being of minimal value, particularly when the attorneys
attending the sessions are not the ones who will try the case or lack authority to
enter into binding stipulations." Id.
90. For a discussion of other sanctions provided for under the new amend-
ments, see infra notes 114-25 and accompanying text.
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f) provides:
Sanctions. If party or party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or
pretrial order, or if no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a
scheduling or pretrial conference, or if a party or party's attorney is
substantially unprepared to participate in the conference, or if a party
or party's attorney fails to participate in good faith, the judge, upon
motion or his own initiative, may make such orders with regard thereto
as are just, and among others any of the orders provided in Rule
37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D). In lieu of or in addition to any other sanction, the
judge shall require the party or the attorney representing him or both
to pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of any noncompliance
with this rule, including attorney's fees, unless the judge finds that the
noncompliance was substantially justified or that other circumstances
make an award of expenses unjust.
Id.
92. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b). For a discussion of sanctions available under rule
37(b), see supra note 32.
93. The limitations imposed by the 1983 amendments will affect the depth
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vided: "Unless the court orders otherwise under subdivision (c)
of this rule, the frequency of use of these [discovery] methods is
not limited." 94 To mitigate the problems of duplicative, redun-
dant and excessive discovery, the drafters eliminated that sen-
tence of the rule.95 The new rule places the following specific
limitations on discovery:
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery
methods set forth in subdivision (a) shall be limited by
the court if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable
from some other source that is more convenient, less
burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking dis-
covery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the ac-
tion to obtain the information sought; or (iii) the
discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking
into account the needs of the case, the amount in contro-
rather than the breadth of discovery. The broad, sweeping language of rule
26(b)(1), which permits discovery of "any matter, not privileged, which is rele-
vant to the subject matter involved in the pending action," has been retained.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The drafters considered and rejected proposals to
limit the scope of discovery under rule 26(b)(1) to matters "relevant to issues
raised by the claims or defenses" or "relevant to the claims or defenses." See
SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF DISCOVERY ABUSES, Report, supra note 8,
at 157. These proposed limitations would have narrowed the scope of discov-
ery. However, such limitations on the breadth of discovery may well misperceive
the real source of discovery abuse: discovery that is too deep, i.e., redundant,
duplicative, or costly, and not that which is too broad. Rosenberg & King, supra
note 8, at 586 (frequently, excessive discovery is not irrelevant, but just redun-
dant). Moreover, limitations on the breadth of discovery would virtually elimi-
nate notice pleading and might prove meaningless in a system that allows
pleadings to be amended freely. Id. at 583 (notice pleading would be wiped out
by scope limiting amendments, but amendments would be useless in the face of
liberal pleading amendment rules); Schroeder & Frank, The Proposed Changes in
the Discovery Rules, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 475, 481-90 (considering whether discov-
ery should be confined to "issues" instead of "subjeCt matter" or "claims"). In
addition, it would probably take the courts years to define "issues" or "relevant
to the claims or defenses." Rosenberg & King, supra, at 584. Given these con-
siderations, it appears that the Advisory Committee acted wisely in seeking to
limit the depth of discovery, rather than its breadth.
94. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a), 398 U.S. 982 (1970).
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a). The new rule provides:
Discovery Methods. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of
the following methods: depositions upon oral examination or written
questions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things
or permission to enter upon land or other property, for inspection and
other purposes; physical and mental examinations; and requests for
admission.
Id. The purpose of eliminating the final sentence of the old rule was to urge the
court to identify and limit needless discovery. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) advisory
committee note.
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versy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the im-
portance of the issues at stake in the litigation. The
court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable no-
tice or pursuant to a motion under subdivision (c). 96
These amendments modify existing discovery practice in two im-
portant respects. First, they alter the longstanding presumption
in favor of disclosure by providing for specific limitations on the
right of pretrial inquiry; and second, by providing for judicial in-
tervention, they constitute an implicit acknowledgement that dis-
covery cannot always operate on a self-regulating basis.
1. Limitations on Discovery
The three subsections of rule 26(b)(1) address discovery
problems that have received too little attention in the past. Rule
26(b)(1)(i) expressly prohibits redundant discovery. 97 This pro-
hibition should eliminate the vexatious practice of "criss-cross-
ing" document demands, which involves asking for the same
materials over and over to assure that nothing has been missed.
In addition, under this rule interrogatories are now inappropriate
when they seek information that has already been obtained by
oral deposition.
Rule 26(b)(1)(i) also provides that the court may intervene
where the information sought could be obtained more efficiently
by another means of discovery. 98 This provision should en-
courage attorneys to be cost-sensitive in invoking a given mode of
discovery. For example, if information regarding company sales
is sought and such information is contained in company records,
a deposition may be deemed inappropriate.
Rule 26(b)(1)(ii) seeks to reduce redundancy by requiring at-
torneys to make the most of each discovery demand. Under this
subsection, a court is empowered to prohibit or otherwise limit
opportunities for discovering parties to reopen depositions or to
have a second look at documents which an adversary has previ-
ously produced. 99
Perhaps the most significant discovery limitations are those
contained in rule 26(b)(1)(iii). This new subsection attacks the
problem of excessive discovery by providing that discovery shall
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
97. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)(i).
98. Id.
99. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)(ii).
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be proportional to the magnitude of the case.100 Simply put, the
rule will not permit litigants to use a bazooka where a water pistol
will do. The rule contemplates that the parties will be selective in
invoking various discovery devices; parties no longer are free,
necessarily, to follow a discovery program that leaves "no stone
unturned." Nor will parties be permitted to follow a "scorched
earth" discovery policy calculated to coerce an adversary into ca-
pitulation. Thus, it would appear that a discovery program cost-
ing $50,000 in a case involving claims for $10,000 ordinarily
would transgress rule 26(b)(1)(iii).101
2. Judicial Intervention
In addition to limiting the depth of pretrial disclosure, the
new rule 26(b)(1) encourages the court to monitor actively the
discovery process. Heretofore, discovery had been largely self-
regulating, with the court intervening only when called upon by
the parties.' 0 2 The new rule empowers the court to regulate dis-
covery on its own motion to, for example, prevent a certain party
from invoking a particular mode of discovery or to limit the
number of depositions in a particular case. 10 3 Amended rule
26(b)(1) complements the new rule 16 in that the court's regulat-
ing function may be exercised in conjunction with periodic pre-
trial conferences encouraged under rule 16.104 Properly used,
these two rules taken together will alert the judge to trouble
before a discovery bottleneck arises, thereby preventing the litiga-
tion from becoming hopelessly bogged down, irrespective of the
posture of the parties. 10 5
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(l)(iii).
101. For a discussion of the lack of clarity in the proportionality standard
enunciated in rule 26(b)(1)(iii), see infra notes 139-47 and accompanying text.
102. For a discussion of the problems inherent in a self-regulating system
of discovery, see supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
103. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The rule provides that "[t]he frequency or
extent of use of the discovery methods ... shall be limited by the court" in the
event that a party violates the discovery limitations set forth in the rule. Id. The
drafters intended the court's sanctioning power to guard against redundant or
disproportionate discovery. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee note.
104. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee note (it is appropriate for
court to act under rule 26(b)(1) in conjunction with pretrial conferences). For a
discussion of rule 16, see supra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
105. Miller & Culp, supra note 65, at 25, col. 1, 34, col. 1 (former presump-
tion of unlimited discovery is reversed under rules 16 and 26, and the court is
obligated under those rules to intervene and restrict the discovery process in
appropriate situations).
1985]
23
Cavanagh: The August 1, 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
3. Certification
Rule 26(g) imposes an affirmative duty upon attorneys to en-
gage in pretrial discovery in a responsible manner consistent with
rules 26-37.106 Rule 26(g) is further designed to limit discovery
abuses by explicitly encouraging imposition of sanctions. 10 7 The
rule provides that, by signing a discovery response or objection,
an attorney is certifying that it is:
(1) consistent with these rules and warranted by ex-
isting law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not inter-
posed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost
of litigation; and (3) not unreasonable or unduly burden-
some or expensive, given the needs of the case, the dis-
covery already had in the case, the amount in
controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in
the litigation. 108
The Advisory Committee noted that while rule 26(g) is
designed to make an attorney "pause and consider" the reasona-
bleness of a discovery request or response, it is not meant to dis-
courage legitimate and necessary discovery. 10 9 Attorneys are
required to inquire into the factual basis of a discovery request,
response or inquiry. 110 However, the attorney's signature does
not constitute a certification as to the truthfulness of the client's
factual responses to a discovery request.I' Rather, it means that
the attorney has made a reasonable effort to determine that the
client has provided all information or documents available to him
that are responsive to the discovery demand. 1 2 Thus, rule 2 6(g)
certifications must be distinguished from other signature require-
ments under the Federal Rules, such as those found in rule 33
(interrogatories) and rule 30(e) (depositions)." 13
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) advisory committee note.
107. Id. For a discussion of sanctions under rule 26(g), see infra notes 114-
25 and accompanying text.
108. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (g).
109. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) advisory committee note.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. Answers to interrogatories pursuant to rule 33(a) and depositions
pursuant to rule 30(e) are signed under oath; the signer swears to the truth of
the statements therein. See FED. R. Cv. P. 33(a), 30(e). This is clearly different
from rule 26 (g) certification, in which the signer merely certifies that he has
790 [Vol. 30: p. 767
24
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [1985], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss3/3
FEDERAL RULES: 1983 AMENDMENTS
C. Sanctions
'Perhaps the most controversial concept in the 1983 amend-
ments is the imposition of mandatory sanctions for violation of
the certification procedures required under rule 7(b)(3) (mo-
tions), rule 11 (pleadings) and rule 26 (g) (discovery requests).
Rule 26(g) provides in relevant part:
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall im-
pose upon the person who made the certification, the
party on whose behalf the request, response, or objec-
tion is made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which
may include an order to pay the amount of the reason-
able expenses incurred because of the violation, includ-
ing a reasonable attorney's fee." 14
The words "shall impose" make sanctions mandatory for vio-
lation of the certification procedures and demonstrate the draft-
ers' intentions that noncompliance result in sanctions." 5 The
certification procedure and mandatory sanctions for violation
thereof are designed to deter both excessive discovery and eva-
sion of legitimate discovery." 6 When read in combination with
other amendments, the signing requirement now means that each
discovery request, response or objection (1) be grounded on a
theory that is reasonable in law or a good faith belief as to what
the law should be, (2) not be interposed for any improper pur-
pose, and (3) not be disproportionate to the case." 7 Application
of this standard will depend heavily on the facts of each case and,
for that reason alone, is quite problematic." 8
Just as rule 26(g) imposes mandatory sanctions for discovery
made a reasonable effort to provide all responsive information and documents.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) advisory committee note.
114. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (g).
115. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (g) advisory committee note. The drafters observed:
The new rule mandates that sanctions be imposed on attorneys who fail
to meet the standards established in the first portion of Rule 26(g).
The nature of the sanction is a matter ofjudicial discretion to be exer-
cised in light of the particular circumstances.
Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. To date, there are no decisions fleshing out the standards articu-
lated in rule 26(b), particularly those relating to proportionality. However, the
broad standards for certification under rule 26 (g) are apt to give rise to varying
and inconsistent interpretations among the district courts, to the potential detri-
ment of the unwary practitioner.
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abuse, rule 11 prescribes mandatory sanctions for a violation of
certification procedures relating to pleadings and motions." 9 By
signing the pleading or motion, the attorney certifies that he has
read the papers; that, after reasonable inquiry, he has concluded
that it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or
a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal
of existing law; and that it is not interposed for any improper pur-
pose. 120 The certification portion of rule 11 provides in relevant
part:
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in
violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its
own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed
it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction,
which may include an order to pay to the other party or
parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other
paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.' 2'
Rule 11 sanctions are designed to deter frivolous pleading
and groundless discovery motions, particularly those interposed
119. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
The mandatory nature of sanctions under rule 11 was underscored in
Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985). The
court in Eastway stated:
By employing the imperative "shall," we believe the drafters in-
tended to stress the mandatory nature of the imposition of sanctions
pursuant to the rule. Unlike the statutory provisions that vest the dis-
trict court with "discretion" to award fees, Rule 11 is clearly phrased as
a directive. Accordingly, where strictures of the rule have been trans-
gressed, it is incumbent upon the district court to fashion proper
sanctions.
A natural concomitant of a mandatory imposition of sanctions is a
broadened scope of review by the Court of Appeals. Where the only
question on appeal becomes whether, in fact, a pleading was ground-
less, we are in as good a position to determine the answer and, thus, we
need not defer to the lower court's opinion.
At the same time, however, we note that the district courts retain
broad discretion in fashioning sanctions, and apportioning fees be-
tween attorney and client. The commentary to Rule 11 sets forth a
number of the factors that will be examined in arriving at an appropri-
ate award, and in determining by whom any costs will be borne. In
reviewing the specifics of an award of attorneys' fees, therefore, we
shall continue to adhere to the "abuse of discretion" standard.
Id. at 254 n.7.
Rule 7(b)(3) provides that under rule 11 the certification requirements for
rule 11 pleadings shall also apply to motions. FED. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(3).
120. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
121. Id.
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for the purposes of harassment or delay. 122 By including the term
"Sanctions" in the caption of rule 11, the draftsmen hoped to call
attention to such procedures and to emphasize that sanctions are
not to be viewed simply as an empty threat.' 23  Moreover,
amended rule 11 makes clear that sanctions may be imposed on
the attorney personally as well as on the client. t24 It should be
noted that where the issue relates to a discovery motion, rule 1 1
governs; but where the issue relates to a discovery request, rule
26 is the appropriate standard. 125
III. WILL THE 1983 AMENDMENTS ALLEVIATE DISCOVERY
ABUSE?
While it is still too early to analyze definitively the impact of
the 1983 amendments, it appears that their approach, especially
the heavy reliance on sanctions as a behavior modification device,
has serious drawbacks that may exacerbate rather than remedy
the problems of discovery abuse.
A. Litigation Costs and the 1983 Rules
Perhaps the most significant problem with respect to discov-
ery is that of cost: cost in terms of the enormous and seemingly
122. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note (imposition of sanctions
designed to "discourage dilatory or abusive tactics").
123. Id. (new language in the rule intended to reduce the "reluctance of
courts to impose sanctions").
124. Id.
125. Although they apply to discrete situations, the standards of rule 11
and rule 26 are interrelated. In commentary, the Advisory Committee stated:
The duty to make a "reasonable inquiry" is satisfied if the investi-
gation undertaken by the attorney and the conclusions drawn there-
from are reasonable under the circumstances. It is an objective
standard similar to the one imposed by Rule 11.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) advisory committee note.
Curiously, while cases interpreting rule 26(g) are almost nonexistent, there
have been a number of cases in which sanctions have been imposed under Rule
11. See, e.g., Wells v. Oppenheimer & Co., 101 F.R.D. 358 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)
(counsel fees awarded against party who moved for summary judgment in case
where there were obvious questions of fact and motion was clearly futile); Rod-
gers v. Lincoln Towing Service, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 13, 28 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (coun-
sel fees awarded against plaintiff in a civil rights action where the court found
"no possible justification under an objective standard for loading down a com-
plaint with worthless claims ... , totally unsupported by even a single allegation
in the complaint"). The appearance of more rule 11 cases may indicate that it is
easier for a court to detect sham suits or motions than to identify discovery
abuse. Courts also may be generally reluctant to impose rule 26 (g) sanctions,
given the lawyer's ethical obligation of zealous representation, This counter-
vailing consideration may arise less frequently in rule 11 cases where bad faith
and maintenance may be inferred with more certainty.
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uncapped financial burdens that discovery imposes upon litigants;
cost in terms of the strains discovery motion practice and hear-
ings impose upon our already overtaxed judiciary; and cost to the
society at large in terms of delay in the just resolution of disputes
between litigants.' 26 Yet, the solution offered by the 1983
amendments-sanctions-is likely to increase rather than to de-
crease all of the above-mentioned costs.
Sanctions proceedings are in themselves costly. They force
litigants to incur the legal expenses of bringing a motion, prepar-
ing a brief and gathering proof. It is not unusual for a formal
hearing on sanctions to turn out to be a minitrial. 27 In addition,
sanctions proceedings delay the ultimate resolution of claims and
divert the attention of the court and the parties from the substan-
tive matters at stake in the litigation. Precisely because sanctions
are costly and tend to delay the progress of the case, the clever
advocate, cloaked in righteousness, may well be able to gain an
unfair advantage over an opponent by using sanctions as a tool to
sap the adversary's financial strength. Thus, increased reliance
on sanctions as a method of effecting reform of discovery practice
may prove self-defeating.1 2 8
126. See Rosenberg & King, supra note 8, at 588-89 (advocating amend-
ments to rule 26 that would require greater judicial involvement in the discovery
process so as to reduce the costs of unnecessary duplication and repetition in
discovery. Weinstein, Reflections on 1983 Amendments to U.S. Rules of Civil Procedure,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 14, 1983, at 1, col. 2.
127. For an example of a case in which the discovery hearing resembled a
minitrial of the case, see In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138
(N.D. Ill. 1979). In this case, the question was whether defendants had violated
a discovery order by refusing to turn over certain "foreign documents". Id. at
1142. Upon plaintiffs motion for sanctions, a three-week hearing was held in
which over a dozen witnesses testified and a plethora of documentary evidence
was introduced. The dilatory effect of such a "hearing" is obvious.
128. The possibility that the costs of sanctions exceed the benefits was in-
deed a concern of the drafters of the 1983 amendments. In commenting on the
amendments, Advisory Committee Reporter Arthur Miller wrote:
A more realistic concern is that the very availability of sanctions will
become an attractive plaything of the bar-sanctions will take on a life
of their own. The fear is that the new rules may become a Frankenstein
monster by generating satellite litigation about sanctions. Lawyers will
rationalize that professional responsibility requires them to seek sanc-
tions to reduce their clients' litigation costs.
Under the worst scenario, the system will expend more on sanction
proceedings than it saves through deterrence. To guard against that
possibility, the advisory committee note appropriately indicates that
discovery in connection with a sanction proceeding should be con-
ducted only with leave of court.
Unfortunately, litigation has become so uncivilized in many con-
texts that greater reliance on the sanction process becomes imperative.
So it seems realistic to anticipate a sharp escalation in sanction applica-
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B. The 1983 Amendments and the Courts
A second major question mark regarding the 1983 amend-
ments is whether the judiciary will share the drafters' enthusiasm
for sanctions and active intervention during discovery. The new
rules provide little incentive for the already overburdened judici-
ary to assume the added responsibilities of monitoring discovery,
nor do they provide any penalties for judges who fail to do so.
1. Sanctions and the Courts
It is unlikely that the court will impose sanctions for discov-
ery abuse under the new rules with any greater enthusiasm than
they did prior to the 1983 amendments. 129 Imposition of sanc-
tions on an attorney may subject that individual to public dis-
grace, the stigma of which may seriously impair his ability to
practice law successfully in the future. Because of these serious
consequences, courts, mindful of the attorney's ethical obligation
to represent zealously the interests of his client, are reluctant to
tions during the next few years-they may become the cottage industry
of 1984-'85, much the way class actions were in the early 1970s.
Miller & Culp, supra note 65, at 34. Another commentator, Judge Edward R.
Becker, of the Third Circuit, has observed:
What [the 1983 rules] will give us, to be sure, are new layers of
hearings. Now we will have Rule 1 I hearings, and then we will have
discovery on the Rule 11 issue. If you want to proliferate litigation, if
you want to cause further delay, pass these rules because we will have
sanctions hearings coming out of our ears, and lawyers won't hesitate
to use them.
Becker, supra note 86, at 439.
129. ConsiderJudge Becker's remarks on the subject:
Rule 11 sanctions, Rule 37 sanctions, the Antitrust Improvement
Act, sanctions, sanctions and more sanctions, amendments to the Fed-
eral Rules which I would describe only as open season on lawyers! I am
pleased to be present at this laudable exercise in collegial masochism. I
don't think I have ever before seen lawyers advocate sanctions on other
lawyers.
Well, am I one of these weak-kneed judges who didn't impose
$250 or $500 or $1,000 sanctions on the theory that everybody is in the
same boat and next time it is the other guy's turn and one hand washes
the other? I confess that I rarely impose sanctions, but that is because I
believe that you can't legislate morality. I view advocacy of stronger
sanctions, Rule 1I sanctions, Rule 37 sanctions, which are the strongest
of all sanctions under the Antitrust Improvements Act, (the amend-
ment to 28 U.S. Code Section 1927, which says the sanctions can come
right out of the lawyer's pocket) as legislating morality, and I have dis-
agreed violently with Arthur Miller about new rules, which, as I have
said, are sanctions, sanctions and more sanctions. I don't think that is
the way to solve the problem.
Becker, supra note 86, at 439. For a discussion of the possible explanations for
judges' reluctance to impose sanctions under the previous rules, see supra note
33 and accompanying text.
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penalize an attorney for discovery conduct which conceivably
could be characterized merely as overaggressive. 30 The natural
inclination of courts has been to give the attorney who "plays it
close to the line" the benefit of the doubt.' 3 l
Nor is the fact that sanctions are mandatory under the new
rules, rather than discretionary as in the past, likely to change this
attitude. Where a judge feels disinclined to impose sanctions, he
will undoubtedly find a way to characterize conduct as consonant
with the Federal Rules. It would thus appear that, except for
egregious cases, judges will retain defacto latitude in the imposi-
tion of sanctions.
A second, and perhaps more significant reason for the reluc-
tance of courts to impose sanctions for discovery abuse, is their
desire to avoid the ill feelings among members of the bar and
between the bench and bar that are generated when sanctions
motions are filed.1 32 Much more can be accomplished in discov-
ery where the parties are cooperating and communicating with
one another to resolve differences than where they are constantly
running to court for judicial resolution. Sanctions practice tends
to disrupt any rapport which may have existed between opposing
counsel. Indeed, the filing of a sanctions motion may be viewed
as tantamount to a declaration of war. It is difficult enough for
adversaries to work together on discovery under normal circum-
stances; the threat of sanctions only adds to the tension.
Thirdly, it is far from clear that imposition of sanctions will
deter misconduct in discovery. It may be that sanctions will work
as a direct deterrent in the sense that a sanctioned attorney will be
less likely to transgress in the future. However, the in terrorem ef-
fect, the effect on the conduct of all attorneys as a result of impo-
sition of sanctions on attorney X, is not empirically demonstrable
and may well be insignificant, given the predisposition of many
judges against sanctions.
2. Active Judicial Supervision of Discovery
As noted above, amended rules 16 and 26 encourage active
involvement in pretrial proceedings by judges.' 33 However,
130. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
131. Sofaer, supra note 8, at 703-06.
132. See Weinstein, supra note 126, at 4, col. 1 (sanctions "are counter-
productive because they are bound to create ill will-among attorneys and be-
tween the judge and attorneys" making it more difficult to handle a case because
lawyers will be mad at each other).
133. See supra notes 63-125 and accompanying text.
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given the fact that the federal judiciary is already taxed to the
limit, it is unrealistic to think that judges will have either the time
or the inclination to devote themselves to discovery matters in-
stead of trials, dispositive motions, criminal sentencing or settle-
ment negotiations. 134  Not every case requires close judicial
monitoring. 135 To be sure, complex litigation, including antitrust
and securities matters, ought to command the court's close atten-
tion from the outset of the pretrial stages, but these cases are the
exception, not the rule.' 3 6 Our judicial resources are meager
enough as matters now stand. The mandates of the new rules
may prove overwhelming for the courts.
3. Judicial Resolution of Discovery Disputes
Another serious drawback of the 1983 amendments is their
failure to address the judiciary's inability to resolve discovery dis-
putes promptly. While the judges may be faulted to a degree for
slow turnaround time on discovery motions, much of the delay is
caused by factors beyond their control, notably heavy
caseloads.' 3 7 Judges were having a difficult enough time keeping
matters current before the amendments took effect. It is not real-
istic to assume that they will be able to devote the additional time
to discovery matters as contemplated by the amended rules.
This added burden upon the judges' limited time is exacer-
134. See Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 A.B.A.J. 1648,
1650 (1981) (questioning the wisdom of the shift in emphasis from attorney self-
regulation to judicial control of the discovery process).
135. For a discussion of rule 16's recognition of the need for exemptions to
the general rule of judicial intervention, see supra notes 69-70 and accompany-
ing text.
136. Proof of claims and defenses under the antitrust, patent, copyright and
securities laws frequently require complicated and detailed factual investigation.
See Kendig, supra note 84, at 703-05 (1975) (recognizing that courts faced with
certain classes of cases must deal with unusually complex or esoteric factual is-
sues that require the court to evaluate extremely complex testimony and docu-
mentary evidence). Where complaints in such cases make sweeping allegations
of widespread wrongdoing, the scope of discovery may seem boundless. Id. at
705. Unless the trial judge takes control of the pretrial proceedings at the out-
set, the case is likely to get out of hand quickly. Id. at 712.
On the other hand, excessive discovery is rarely a problem in a large
number of matters entertained by the federal courts, including FELA cases,
Jones Act cases, diversity cases, social security matters and habeas corpus peti-
tions. FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee note. Hence, there is no need for
close judicial monitoring of discovery in these cases. Id. See also supra notes 69-
70 and accompanying text.
137. For a discussion of the factors contributing to judicial inefficiency in
handling discovery matters, including overburdened court calendars, see supra
notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
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bated by the Advisory Committee's emphasis on the need to have
the trial judge involved in discovery, and by its explicit discour-
agement of the use of magistrates to handle discovery disputes.13
Spurning the magistrate, a potentially valuable resource in han-
dling discovery disputes, will only enhance the inefficiency that
currently exists in resolving disclosure controversies, and thereby
undercut the goal of prompt disposition of pretrial disputes. The
new rules thus erect additional institutional barriers for the judici-
ary which may well slow, rather than hasten, pretrial proceedings.
C. Defining Proportionality
The limitations on the depth of discovery enunciated in
amended rule 26(b)(1) have been welcomed in some quarters as
necessary.' 3 9 Few attorneys would quarrel with the proposition
that unreasonably cumulative discovery or discovery that could be
better obtained from another source ought to be limited. 140 Nor
is there likely to be much objection to limiting discovery where
the parties have had ample opportunity to obtain the information
sought. 14' However, the proportionality standard of rule
26(b)(1)(iii) raises a serious conceptual problem. 142 As an ab-
stract proposition, the notion that discovery ought to be propor-
tional to the needs of the case makes perfect sense.143 However,
138. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee note. The drafters state:
The use of the term "judge" in [Rule 16(b)] reflects the Advisory Com-
mittee's judgment that it is preferable that this task [of issuing a discov-
ery scheduling order] should be handled by a district judge rather than
a magistrate, except when the magistrate is acting under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c).
Id.
139. For example, Judge Becker made the following observations:
Do you have a right to unlimited discovery? Ultimately I suppose
everything comes down to the due process clause. Do you have a right
under the due process clause to turn over every stone? The case has
never been presented, but I don't think you do, and I think that strong
discovery control with deadlines that are adhered to is now received
wisdom as is strong document management and creation of document
depositories. If you have a computerized litigation support system,
there is a possibility of common computerized data banks.
Becker, supra note 86, at 441.
140. For a discussion of this limitation in rule 26(b)(1)(i), see supra notes
97-98 and accompanying text.
141. For a discussion of this limitation in rule 26(b)(l)(ii), see supra text
accompanying note 99.
142. For a discussion of rule 26(b)(1)(iii)'s proportionality standard, see
supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
143. See Rosenberg & King, supra note 8, at 586-87 (much of the "truly abu-
sive discovery" that occurs is discovery that is "too deep rather than too broad"
and is "simply disproportionately costly in relation to the values at stake in the
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the practical implementation of such an ill-defined standard is dif-
ficult.144 The rule itself provides no guidance as to when discov-
ery is unduly burdensome and expensive other than its reference
to (1) the needs of the case; (2) the amount in controversy; (3) the
parties' resources; and (4) the importance of issues at stake in the
litigation.' 45 The drafters make it clear that amount in contro-
versy is not to be a benchmark when important matters of public
policy are involved, but they say little more.146 Thus, limitations
imposed by the nebulous proportionality standard will have to be
defined on a case by case basis, and it will be many years before
the parameters of proportionality even approach clarity.' 47 The
impact of the proportionality rule on discovery is predictable: ad-
ditional motion practice to define proportionality in a given case,
which in turn will lead to added litigation expense and greater
delay in the pretrial phases of a case.
litigation"). A proportionality standard addresses the problem of discovery
abuse by trying to bring the amount of discovery into line with the stakes of the
particular individual case.
144. See Sherman & Kinnard, supra note 34, at 276. These commentators
observe:
A potential difficulty with this approach [of proportionality] is in
finding principled criteria for differentiating between various types of
cases. What values should be used in deciding whether, for example,
the plaintiff in a $10,000 personal injury case should be limited in the
number of depositions he may take, or the plaintiff seeking reinstate-
ment in an employment discrimination case should be prohibited from
discovering documents only tangentially related to the claim, or the de-
fendant in a $10,000,000 product liability case should be allowed to
require answers to voluminous interrogatories involving the most
searching details of the plaintiff's past life? Where, one may ask, are
judges expected to find the criteria and analytical structure for making
such judgments?
Economics, particularly market theory regarding the exchange of
goods and services through the price mechanism, provides one obvious
frame of reference. The optimal use of resources in producing a given
output or in accomplishing a given task is a positive value under market
economics. Misallocation of litigation resources into unnecessary dis-
covery or prolonged legal disputes over how discovery will take place
(imposed both on the government through the expenditure of judicial
resources and on the private litigants through costs of either compli-
ance or resistance) increases the transaction costs for accomplishing the
purposes of litigation.
Id. at 276-77 (footnotes omitted).
145. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)(iii).
146. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee note. The drafters stated that
"the rule recognizes that many cases in public policy "spheres, such as employ-
ment practices, free speech, and other matters, may have importance far beyond
the monetary amount involved." Id.
147. See Sherman & Kinnard, supra note 34, at 279 ("[J]udges will have to
develop rules-of-thumb for determining the amount of discovery normally per-
missible in certain types of cases").
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It is even more troublesome that this proportionality stan-
dard is incorporated into the sanctions provisions set forth in rule
26(g). 148 An attorney or his client may be fined or face other pen-
alties for transgressing vaguely defined standards for certification.
This possibility raises serious questions as to whether the propor-
tionality standard comports with due process.149
IV. IMPACT OF THE 1983 AMENDMENTS ON LOCAL DISTRICTS
The national debate surrounding the 1983 amendments has
sparked debate within various districts as to what could be done
on the local level to remedy discovery abuse. Even before the
Supreme Court promulgated the 1983 amendments, several dis-
tricts formed special committees to reexamine discovery practices
within their jurisdictions. 150 Perhaps the most significant local
project was undertaken in the Eastern District of New York,
where a Special Committee on Effective Discovery in Civil Cases
in the Eastern District of New York (Special Committee) con-
ducted an extensive study of discovery practices within the district
and issued a comprehensive report recommending that certain
procedures be adopted by the court. 15 The following discussion
will focus on the work of the Special Committee. Such an analysis
may prove useful because: (1) the committee is a vanguard effort
in attacking discovery abuse on a local level;' 52 (2) it represents
148. For a discussion of the sanction provisions of rule 26(g), see supra
notes 114-25 and accompanying text.
149. One must assume that the drafters believed that the proportionality
standard set forth in rule 26(b)(l)(iii) met the demands of due process. How-
ever, a litigant cannot, consistent with due process, be sanctioned where the rule
violated is so vague in its prohibitions that the litigant cannot reasonably deter-
mine its meaning. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 10-8, at 513
(1978) (quoting Lanzella v. NewJersey, 306 U.S. 451, 458 (1939)). It should be
recognized that the courts traditionally have had wide latitude in the area of
sanctions under the Federal Rules. See, e.g., Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v.
Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinea, 456 U.S. 694, 706-09 (1982) (imposition of
a sanction under rule 37(b)(2)(A) for failure to comply with a discovery order
did not violate litigant's due process rights).
150. On November 30, 1982, ChiefJudge Jack B. Weinstein of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York announced the forma-
tion of a Special Committee on Effective Discovery in Civil Cases for the Eastern
District of New York. Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at 359. Shortly
after Judge Weinstein's announcement, Chief Judge Constance Baker Motley
formed a similar committee in the Southern District of New York. In the South-
ern District of Alabama, a committee on local discovery practices had begun
work even earlier than its counterparts in New York. More recently, a commit-
tee was formed in the District of Rhode Island to reexamine discovery proce-
dures as part of an overall effort to revise local rules there.
151. See Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48.
152. The importance of the Special Committee's effort is underscored by
[Vol. 30: p. 767800
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the work product of a diverse group of attorneys from widely va-
rying practice backgrounds, whose experiences mirror the full
spectrum of litigation brought in the Eastern District;1 53 (3) it
provides novel and sensible approaches to achieving cost effective
discovery; and (4) it may serve as a blueprint for other districts in
fashioning procedures to manage discovery and combat discovery
abuse. 154
A. The Work of the Eastern District
Concerned that the 1983 amendments unduly emphasized
sanctions as the means for remedying discovery abuse, and that
sanctions would serve to fuel skyrocketing litigation costs by en-
couraging expensive satellite litigation, Chief Judge Jack Wein-
stein appointed the Special Committee in December 1982. This
committee was to study the problem of discovery abuse in the
Eastern District, particularly in light of the then-proposed amend-
ments to the Federal Rules, and to propose its own solutions. 155
The Special Committee was charged with the responsibility to:
1. determine how discovery necessary to just and
the fact that ChiefJustice Warren Burger sent copies of the Special Committee's
report and the Eastern District's local rules on discovery to all federal district
court chief judges as an example of one approach to combatting discovery
abuse. See Letter from ChiefJustice Warren Burger (April 2, 1984) (enclosing a
copy of the Eastern District's materials and requesting information from the
chiefjudges as to steps taken in their districts and their suggestions for curbing
discovery abuse).
153. Special Committee members included attorneys from large and small
firms, sole practitioners, those who represent plaintiffs and those who represent
defendants, representatives from the United States Attorney's Office and from
law departments of local governments, academicians, judges, a magistrate and
the district executive. See Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at 360-61
(listing the members of the committee and their professional affiliations).
154. Chief Justice Burger has suggested that the Eastern District's ap-
proach "may provide a helpful pattern" in fashioning local rules in other dis-
tricts. See Letter, supra note 152. The Special Committee was careful to note,
however, that the proposals outlined in its report were tailored to the needs and
resources of the Eastern District and were not necessarily portable to other
districts:
We emphasize that our proposals are geared specifically to the
Eastern District of New York. A careful study was made of the
strengths, case-load, practices and procedure of the bench and bar in
the Eastern District. The recommendations made herein are custom-
ized to that single District and they took into account intangible quali-
ties which may or may not exist in other Districts.
Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at 368. Thus, the Eastern District's
approach should be viewed as a starting point from which other districts may
fashion local rules that fit the needs and resources of their individual situations.
155. See Weinstein, supra note 126, at 4.
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speedy resolutions of disputes can be obtained at mini-
mum costs in money, time and annoyance;
2. publish interim reports so that the bar and liti-
gants can be heard with respect to proposals;
3. meet with all the judges and magistrates of the
Eastern District to arrive at a consensus on the proper
role of court personnel;
4. arrange educational sessions with the bar and
law schools so that the lawyers will understand what is
expected of them;
5. propose any necessary changes in local rules
and forms;
6. prepare a short guide for lawyers on how dis-
covery will be conducted ... to reduce disputes among
counsel and interventions of the court. 156
On August 9, 1983, the Special Committee issued its initial
report in the form of proposed local rules.157 That widely circu-
lated report was the subject of comments from bar associations,
law firms and individual practitioners. 58 Public hearings were
held before the Special Committee and the judges of the district
at the Brooklyn courthouse on November 17, 1983.159 OnJanu-
ary 30, 1984, the Special Committee issued a revised report. On
March 1, 1984, the report, to be known as the Standing Orders of
the Court (Standing Orders), was unanimously adopted by the
Board of Judges of the Eastern District of New York for a three
year period. 160
There are four basic goals of the Standing Orders. The first
is to encourage cooperation in discovery. Second, the orders are
intended to provide prompt access to a judicial officer so as to
resolve discovery disputes expeditiously and with a minimum of
paperwork. A third goal is to provide attorneys with a blueprint
for conducting discovery. This blueprint includes a series of pro-
visions setting forth specific practices that are presumptively inap-
156. Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at 359.
157. Id. at 362.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 363.
160. United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York,
Standing Orders of the Court on Effective Discovery in Civil Cases, 102 F.R.D. 339, 342
(1984) (Chief Judge Weinstein's preface to the standing orders) [hereinafter
cited as Standing Orders]. Following adoption of the Standing Orders, confer-
ences were held to acquaint the practicing bar with the new rules and proce-
dures. Id.
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propriate. Finally, the Standing Orders should offer guidance in
instances where sanctions are either mandated or indicated.' 6 '
An analysis of the Standing Orders in light of their capability for
implementing each of these goals follows.
1. Cooperation Among Attorneys
It would seem axiomatic that discovery proceeds most expe-
ditiously where there is cooperation and courtesy among attor-
neys in all aspects of the pretrial phase of a case. Yet, it is striking
how infrequently opposing counsel communicate with one an-
other in a meaningful way to resolve discovery disputes, and con-
versely, how frequently they communicate on discovery matters
through formal motion practice. It is equally striking how often
attorneys fail to extend to their adversaries basic courtesies in
matters relating to scheduling and timing of various discovery
procedures. Therefore, the Standing Orders contain a salutary, if
only precatory, provision urging counsel to cooperate, consistent
with the interests of their clients, in all phases of the pretrial pro-
cess. 162 To further encourage cooperation in discovery, the
Standing Orders provide that the parties may stipulate to alter,
amend, or modify any practice with respect to discovery, unless
the modification would be contrary to a prior order of the court
entered specifically in that action.' 63 Thus, for example, attor-
neys may agree that it is permissible on deposition to direct wit-
nesses not to answer on grounds other than privilege' 64 or to
provide for a particular method of document production.
2. Judicial Intervention
Judicial intervention in the discovery process may occur in
two separate but related contexts: with respect to the Rule 16
scheduling conference, and with respect to disputes arising dur-
ing the course of discovery.' 65
161. Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at 366-68.
162. Standing Order 1, Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 347. Standing
order 1 provides: "Counsel are expected to cooperate with each other, consis-
tent with the interests of their clients, in all phases of the discovery process and
to be courteous in their dealings with each other, including in matters relating to
scheduling and timing of various discovery procedures." Id.
163. Standing Order 2, Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 347.
164. Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at 369-70 (commentary to
standing order 2).
165. Id. at 370-71 (prefatory note to standing orders on judicial
intervention).
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a. Rule 16 Conferences
As noted, the 1983 amendments to rule 16 encourage active
judicial management of the pretrial phase of the case. 166 How-
ever, the details of pretrial management are left to the discretion
of the court and flexibility is encouraged. 167 Rule 16(b) itself rec-
ognizes that the details relating to scheduling conferences and
scheduling orders may be fleshed out by local district court
rules.' 68 Although the drafters of rule 16 expressed a definite
preference for having the judge handle the task of formulating
and entering the scheduling order,' 69 the rule specifically pro-
vides that a magistrate may be assigned this task when authorized
by local rule.' 70 The Special Committee shared the view that the
judge, rather than the magistrate, should handle such tasks, but it
was also mindful of the fact that the heavy caseloads of district
judges may not permit them to prepare and enter scheduling or-
ders in every case. 171 The Special Committee felt that the bur-
dens on the judges might be eased if magistrates were authorized
to enter scheduling orders in appropriate cases. 172 Whether or
not the judge or a magistrate shall deal with the scheduling order
is left to the discretion of thejudge.173 Similarly, the mode of the
scheduling conference, whether in-person, by mail, by telephone
or otherwise, is left to the discretion of the judge or the assigned
magistrate. 74 The Standing Orders further reduce the burden
on the judiciary by providing that the parties, prior to any sched-
uling conference, shall try to agree on a scheduling order; if they
166. See supra notes 63 & 133 and accompanying text.
167. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(5) (permitting the judge to include "any
other matters appropriate in the circumstances of the case" in a scheduling
order).
168. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) (allowing exemptions from rule 16 compliance
where local district court rules so provide). For a discussion of this aspect of
rule 16, see supra notes 69 & 135 and accompanying text.
169. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) advisory committee note. For a discussion of this
preference, see supra note 138 and accompanying text.
170. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b).
171. Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at 371 (prefatory note to
standing orders on judicial intervention).
172. Id.
173. Standing Order 3(a), Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 347. Standing
order 3(a) provides, in pertinent part, that "the judge shall determine whether
the judge or the magistrate shall deal with the scheduling order." Id.
174. Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at 372 (commentary to
standing order 3(a)). The Special Committee intended that, "[i]n accordance
with Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a), the court shall determine whether to confer by an in-
person scheduling conference, by mail, by telephone or by other suitable
means." Id.
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do agree, such order will be approved routinely by the court. 175
b. Judicial Intervention in Discovery Disputes
A major reason for delays in discovery is the failure of the
judiciary to resolve discovery disputes promptly and decisively.176
While the 1983 amendments encourage judges to monitor pre-
trial proceedings, 77 they provide no mechanism by which to in-
sure prompt disposition of discovery motions. The Special
Committee's revised report provides a number of procedures
which fill the gaps left by the Federal Rules, thereby assuring
prompt access to a judicial officer, and encouraging efficient and
inexpensive resolution of issues. These procedures are briefly ex-
amined below.
(i) Role of the Magistrate
Key to the Special Committee's overall plan for prompt ac-
cess to the courts is prudent use of magistrates.' 78  The Special
Committee envisioned that magistrates would be assigned rou-
175. Standing Order 3(b), Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 347. Standing
order 3(b) provides, in pertinent part:
Prior to any scheduling conference, the attorneys for the parties shall
attempt to agree to a scheduling order and if agreed to, shall submit it
to the court. If such scheduling order is reasonable, the court will ap-
prove it and advise counsel .... If the attorneys for the parties cannot
agree on a scheduling order, they shall promptly advise the court.
Id.
176. For a discussion of the judiciary's failure to act promptly in discovery
matters, see supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
177. For a discussion of the ways in which the new rule 16 encourages ac-
tive judicial involvement in pretrial proceedings, see supra notes 63-87 and ac-
companying text.
178. Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at 371 (prefatory note to
standing orders on judicial intervention). The Special Committee stated:
The Committee... believes that except in cases which by reason of
their importance or complexity require the supervision of a judge, dis-
covery disputes should be determined by a magistrate and that, pursu-
ant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(5), the scheduling order routinely provide
that discovery disputes be raised with the assigned magistrate.
When judicial intervention is necessary in a discovery dispute, the
Committee is of the view that the issue ought to be decided promptly so
as not to stall the litigation. A major criticism which has been levelled
by the practicing bar is the judicial system's failure to determine discov-
ery disputes promptly and decisively, thereby causing delays and addi-
tional expense to the parties. Prompt resolution of discovery issues
minimizes wasted time, lessens needless acrimony between the parties,
and enables attorneys to get on with the pretrial process in an expedi-
tious manner. The Committee believes that utilization of magistrates in
the Eastern District of New York to oversee discovery is a key to ob-
taining prompt resolution of pretrial disputes.
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tinely to handle discovery matters in civil cases. 179 The rationale
for this is fourfold. First, magistrates generally have more time to
devote to discovery matters than judges, since judges face many
more burdens than magistrates.' 80 Thus, a magistrate is more
likely to be available to handle a dispute that occurs during a dep-
osition than is a judge, who may be occupied with other responsi-
bilities. Were the judge the only one authorized to resolve the
dispute, the goal of prompt access and resolution would be
thwarted.
Second, magistrates, through their involvement in the pre-
trial process, may be effective in fostering settlement negotia-
tions. Some judges prefer not to involve themselves in settlement
talks in cases which they will later try, lest they appear biased at
trial.'"' The magistrate faces no such conflict. Because settle-
ment of federal actions is to be encouraged, magistrate involve-
ment in pretrial matters would be beneficial. Moreover, the fact
that the overwhelming majority of cases are settled means that
relatively few actually need the attention of the judge during the
pretrial stage.' 82 Thus, it makes more sense to have judges focus
on the cases that truly merit their attention and have magistrates
handle the rest.
Third, because there are fewer magistrates than judges in
most districts, discovery rulings are more likely to be uniform
where magistrates handle the bulk of discovery.' 8 3 Since few dis-
covery rulings are reviewed in the appellate courts, there is a dis-
parity of standards regarding the propriety of various discovery
179. See Standing Order 4, Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 348. Standing
order 4 provides as follows:
(a) Selection of Magistrate. A magistrate shall be assigned to each case at
random on a rotating basis upon the commencement of the action, ex-
cept in those categories of actions set forth in Civil Rule 45 of this
Court. A magistrate so assigned shall take no action with respect to any
matter until a suitable order of reference is received.
(b) Scope of Reference. At the time the judge determines whether the
judge or the magistrate shall deal with the scheduling order, the judge
shall determine whether discovery matters shall be referred to the mag-
istrate and the scope of such reference. The judge may at any time
enlarge or diminish the scope of any reference to the magistrate.
(c) Orders of Reference. The attorneys for the parties shall be provided
with copies of all orders referring a matter to the magistrate, the scope
of such reference, and any enlargement or diminution thereof.
Id.
180. Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at 373 (commentary to
standing order 4).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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tactics. Such disparity exists not only among districts, but within
districts as well. To the extent that a small group of magistrates is
responsible for discovery matters, uniformity is more likely to be
attained.
Fourth, the magistrates in the Eastern District have proven to
be very capable and as a result have earned the full confidence of
the judges within the district. 84 Thus, there is little reason to
believe that one will receive differing qualities of justice, depend-
ing on whether he or she appears before a magistrate or a
judge. 185
(ii) Assignment of Magistrates
The Standing Orders provide that magistrates will be as-
signed automatically to each case in much the same way that
judges are assigned.186 However, the magistrate has no power to
act until he or she receives an order of reference from the
judge. 187 Thus, the judge is permitted a measure of flexibility in
determining whether, and the extent to which, a magistrate will
be involved in discovery.' 88 The revised report advises that
judges retain control over discovery in complex cases, especially
antitrust and securities matters. 89 The rationale is obvious: un-
less a judge is on top of such cases from the outset, discovery is
apt to grow out of control quickly and ultimate resolution of the
issues will be delayed. 190 Moreover, if parties feel that magistrate
involvement would be inappropriate, they are free to request that
the judge retain control over discovery. 19 1
184. Id.
185. The Eastern District's enthusiasm for and confidence in its magistrates
is not universally shared in other districts. For example, one study found that
Chicago lawyers viewed magistrates as "woefully underequipped in talent, time,
and temperament" to handle complicated discovery disputes. See Brazil, supra
note 41, at 246.
186. Standing Order 4, Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 348. For the text
of standing order 4, see supra note 179.
187. Standing Order 4, Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 348. An order of
reference is an order of the district court referring discovery matters in a partic-
ular case to a magistrate. Id.
188. Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at 373 (commentary to
standing order 4).
189. Id. But see Report of the Discovery Committee of the Southern District of New
York at 4-5 (April 4, 1984) (utilization of magistrates may be particularly effective
in antitrust and securities matters).
190. Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at 373 (commentary to
standing order 4).
191. Id.
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(iii) Reconsideration of a Magistrate's Ruling
Consonant with the provisions of the Magistrates Act 192 and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,' 93 the Standing Orders per-
mit the judge to reconsider a magistrate's ruling on a discovery
matter, but the ruling may be overturned only where it was
"clearly erroneous or contrary to law."' 194 The experience of the
Eastern District has been that magistrates' orders are seldom ap-
pealed and rarely reversed.' 95 Therefore, the Special Committee
did not anticipate that widespread use of magistrates would in-
crease costs of litigation and foster delay. 196
192. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (1982). Section 636(b)(1)(A) provides:
[A] judge may designate a magistrate to hear and determine any pre-
trial matter pending before the court, except a motion for injunctive
relief, for judgment on the pleadings, for summary judgment, to dis-
miss or quash an indictment or information made by the defendant, to
suppress evidence in a criminal case, to dismiss or to permit mainte-
nance of a class action, to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, and to involuntarily dismiss an action. Ajudge of
the court may reconsider any pretrial matter under this subparagraph
... where it has been shown that the magistrate's order is clearly erro-
neous or contrary to law.
Id.
193. FED. R. Civ. P. 72(a). Rule 72(a) provides, in pertinent part:
A magistrate to whom a pretrial matter not dispositive of a claim ... is
referred to hear and determine shall promptly conduct such proceed-
ings as are required. . . . The district judge to whom the case is as-
signed shall consider objections made by the parties, provided they are
served and filed within 10 days after the entry of the order, and shall
modify or set aside any portion of the magistrate's order found to be
clearly erroneous or contrary to law.
Id.
194. Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at 374 (commentary to
standing order 5). Standing order 5 provides as follows:
(a) Procedure. A party may make application to the judge to review a
ruling of the magistrate on a discovery matter pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(a). Such application shall be made by a short-form notice of mo-
tion as appears in Form A, delineating the scope of the issues to be
reviewed by the judge.
(b) Timing. An application for review of a magistrate's order shall be
made to the judge within ten days after the entry of such order.
(c) Written Exposition of Magistrate's Rulings. The magistrate shall enter
into the record a written order setting forth the disposition of the mat-
ter within such ten-day period if requested to do so by the judge or a
party considering review. Such written order may take the form of an
oral order read into the record of a deposition or other proceeding.
Standing Order 5, Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 348.
195. Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at 375 (commentary to
standing order 5).
196. Id.
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(iv) Manner in Which Discovery Disputes Are to Be Raised with the
Court
Perhaps the most innovative and significant features of the
Standing Orders are the procedures designed to handle discovery
disputes expeditiously. The Standing Orders reaffirm the proce-
dure extant in many districts that, prior to seeking judicial resolu-
tion of a discovery dispute, attorneys for the disputants confer in
good faith in an effort to settle the issue. 197
Where the attorneys at a deposition cannot resolve their dif-
ferences regarding a dispute that arises, they must telephone the
judge or magistrate and attempt to come to a resolution in a tele-
phone conference.' 98 The parties may not submit any written pa-
pers prior to the telephone conference. 199 If the dispute is not
resolved during the conference call, the court must take whatever
action it deems appropriate, including additional conferences
with or without the submission of papers.200 If a party to a dis-
pute that is resolved exclusively by means of a telephone confer-
ence is unhappy with the ruling, he may get a de novo
reconsideration by submitting a letter not exceeding five typewrit-
ten pages together with any relevant attachments. 20 1 Other par-
197. See Standing Order 6(a), Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 348. Stand-
ing order 6(a) provides that "[p]rior to seeking judicial resolution of a discovery
dispute, the attorneys for the affected parties or non-party witness shall confer in
good faith in person, by writing, or by telephone in an effort to resolve the dis-
pute." Id. Cf S.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 3(f), (court will not hear any discovery motion
unless the moving party has filed an affidavit certifying that counsel for both
parties were unable to resolve the issue through good faith negotiation); N.D.
ILL. GEN. R. 12(d) (court will not hear any discovery motion unless the moving
party advises the court in writing that parties were unable to reach agreement
after personal consultation and sincere attempts to do so).
198. Standing Order 6(b)(i), Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 348-49.
Standing order 6(b)(i) provides:
Where the attorneys for the affected parties or non-party witness
cannot agree on a resolution of a discovery dispute that arises during
the taking of a deposition, they shall notify the court by telephone and
request a telephone conference with the court to resolve such dispute.
If such dispute is not resolved during the course of the telephone con-
ference, the court shall take other appropriate action, including sched-
uling a further conference without the submission of papers, directing
the submission of papers, or such other action as the court deems just
and proper. Except where a ruling which was made exclusively as a
result of a telephone conference is the subject of de novo review pursu-
ant to (iii) hereof, papers shall not be submitted with respect to such a
dispute unless the court has so directed.
Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Standing Order 6(b)(iii), Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 349. Stand-
ing order 6(b)(iii) provides:
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ties to the dispute are entitled to submit responses which may not
exceed five typewritten pages. 20 2
Where the dispute involves discovery other than by deposi-
tion, the disputants may raise the issue with the court by tele-
phone conference or by a letter not exceeding three pages in
length together with attachments. 203 Where the letter option is
exercised, a written response not exceeding three typewritten
pages may be submitted by the opponent. 20 4 Once the matter is
called to its attention, the court shall, if the dispute is not deter-
mined immediately, direct the disputants to proceed in whatever
manner the court deems appropriate. 20 5
The Standing Orders thus seek to promote expeditious and
inexpensive disposition of discovery disputes without the con-
commitant burden of preparing motion papers. 20 6 To this end,
disputants are encouraged to take advantage of modern telecom-
Where a ruling is made exclusively as a result of a telephone con-
ference it may be the subject of de novo reconsideration by a letter not
exceeding five pages in length attaching relevant materials submitted
by any affected party or non-party witness. Any other affected party or
non-party witness may submit a responsive letter not exceeding five
pages in length attaching relevant materials.
Id.
202. Id.
203. Standing Order 6(b)(ii), Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 349. Stand-
ing order 6(b)(ii) provides:
Where the attorneys for the affected parties or non-party witness
cannot agree on a resolution of any other discovery dispute, they shall
notify the court, at the option of the attorney for any affected party or
non-party witness, either by telephone or by a letter not exceeding
three pages in length outlining the nature of the dispute and attaching
relevant materials. Any opposing affected party or non-party witness
may submit a responsive letter not exceeding three pages in length at-
taching relevant materials. Any affected party or non-party witness may
request a hearing or the opportunity to submit additional written
materials, or to make any other appropriate presentation to the court.
If the dispute is not resolved during the course of the telephone confer-
ence or if the letter option is exercised, the court shall take appropriate
action to resolve the dispute, including scheduling a telephone or other
conference without the submission of papers, directing the submission
of papers, or such other action as the court deems just and proper.
Except for the letters and attachments authorized herein or where a
ruling which was made exclusively as a result of a telephone conference
is the subject of de novo review pursuant to (iii) hereof, papers shall not
be submitted with respect to such a dispute unless the court has so
directed.
Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at 376 (commentary to
standing order 6).
810 [Vol. 30: p. 767
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munications in lieu of expensive and time-consuming in-person
courtroom hearings. 20 7 There is simply no reason to have such
hearings when the matter can be heard more quickly, at a lower
cost, and just as effectively by conference call. 20 8 While the Spe-
cial Committee preferred the telephone procedure for raising dis-
covery disputes, it also recognized that telephone conferences
may prove inadequate in some instances and therefore permitted
written presentations at the option of the moving party.20 9
The procedures adopted in the revised report have the addi-
tional benefit of routinizing the hearing and determination of dis-
covery disputes. 210" Prior to the implementation of these
procedures, the mechanics of bringing discovery motions in the
Eastern District varied from judge to judge. 211 Some insisted on
briefs and hearings; others required that briefs be submitted with-
out oral argument; and still others required a pre-motion confer-
ence before any written materials could be submitted. With
procedures now more standardized, discovery matters can be
handled in a cost-efficient and far less confusing manner. 212
3. Conduct of Discovery
As noted, the Federal Rules deal with discovery in broad out-
line and provide little detail as to practical mechanics.2 13 Fre-
quently, discovery abuse occurs not out of callous disregard for
the Federal Rules, but rather because attorneys are unsure of the
boundaries of propriety. Indeed, many discovery practices can-
not be fit into black letter categories of "do's and don'ts". While
recognizing the need for flexibility, the Special Committee never-
theless felt it appropriate to identify presumptively proper or im-
207. Id. at 377.
208. Id.
209. See id.
210. Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at 365 (citing reduction of
inconsistency and differences in rulings by different judges and magistrates in
the district as an important reason to adopt the proposed standing orders).
211. Id. The Special Committee observed that identification of appropriate
practices to be followed throughout the district "should tend to reduce differ-
ences and inconsistency in rulings by the different judges and magistrates of the
Court. There has been some concern expressed by the bar that a discovery
practice engaged in by the same lawyer is condoned or complimented by one
judge and criticized by another. Standing Orders should significantly reduce
this unpredictability." Id.
212. Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at 377 (commentary to
standing order 6).
213. For a discussion of the broadness of the language of the Federal Rules
and the effect of such language on discovery practice, see supra notes 24-29 and
accompanying text.
1985]
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proper conduct in various circumstances. 214 The revised report
emphasized that the standards are applied only presumptively,
meaning that the attorney deviating from the standard has the
burden of justifying his or her conduct.2 15
a. Conduct at Depositions
Of all modes of discovery, it is perhaps most difficult to draw
bright line rules of presumptively correct behavior in the realm of
deposition practice. Many deposition practices fall into a vast
gray area that is neither specifically authorized nor specifically
prohibited by the Federal Rules. 216 As has been noted, for exam-
ple, although the practice of instructing a witness not to answer a
question calling for privileged information is widely accepted by
practicing attorneys and the courts, there is no specific authoriza-
tion for this practice under the Federal Rules.2 17 Yet to force wit-
nesses to divulge privileged information on deposition would
have far-reaching and potentially disastrous ramifications. 218
To assist attorneys in navigating this murky area of the law,
and thereby avoid costly motion practice, as well as delay, the
Standing Orders incorporate a series of presumptions with re-
spect to behavior on depositions. The following is a summary of
these presumptions:
(1) Directions not to answer questions at deposi-
214. See Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at 365. The Special
Committee stated that, "particularly with respect to controversial matters, it is
better that the appropriate presumptive practice be known to all practitioners
rather than be the subject of doubt or mystery." Id.
215. Id. at 368. The Special Committee articulated the "presumptively ap-
propriate" standard as follows: "Presumptively, as used in this report, simply
means that if an attorney chooses to act differently, the burden is on him or her
to justify such conduct if challenged. This mechanism leaves ample room to
deal with aberrant situations or particular circumstances calling for different be-
havior." Id.
216. See surpa notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
217. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(c). In fact, the rules seems to suggest that objec-
tions to any aspect of a deposition do not justify an instruction not to answer:
All objections made at the time of the examination to qualifications of
the officer taking the deposition, or to the manner of taking it, or to the
evidence presented, or to the conduct of any party, and any other ob-
jection to the proceedings, shall be noted by the officer upon the depo-
sition. Evidence objected to shall be taken subject to the objections.
Id. (emphasis added).
218. See International Union of Elec., Radio and Mach. Workers v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 91 F.R.D. 277, 279 (D.D.C. 1981) (rule 30(c) should not be
applied to mandate disclosure to privileged matter merely because such material
is sought; strict application of the rule would undermine the values traditionally
protected by privilege rules).
[Vol. 30: p. 767812
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tions on the grounds of privilege are presumptively
proper, but the interrogating party is entitled to know
the precise privilege being asserted and the bases there-
for.219 Where the direction not to answer is given and
honored with respect to non-privileged information,
either party may seek a ruling from the court, but pend-
ing such a ruling the objection stands. 220
(2) Objections in the presence of the witness sug-
gesting the response to a particular question are pre-
sumptively improper.22'
219. See Standing Order 21(a)(1), Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 353.
Standing order 21(a)(1) provides that where an attorney instructs a deponent
not to answer on grounds of privilege,
the attorney asserting the privilege shall identify during the deposition
the nature of the privilege (including work product) which is being
claimed and if the privilege is being asserted in connection with a claim
or defense governed by state law, indicate the state's privilege rule be-
ing invoked.
Id.
220. See Standing Order 11 (b), (c), Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 351.
Standing orders 11 (b) and (c) provide as follows:
(b) Where a direction not to answer.., a question [calling for a non-
privileged answer] is given and honored by the witness, either party
may seek a ruling as to the validity of such direction.
(c) If a prompt ruling cannot be obtained, the direction not to answer
may stand and the deposition should continue until (1) a ruling is ob-
tained or (2) the problem resolves itself.
Id. Directions not to answer at depositions present a problem that is not suscep-
tible to any bright line rules. The Special Committee gave its imprimatur to
instructions not to answer based on privilege, but found that such instructions
based on other grounds are frequently misused by attorneys to impede the pro-
gress of a deposition. See Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at 381
(commentary to standing order 11). In the Special Committee's view, it is
clearly improper to instruct a witness not to answer solely on the grounds of
objection to the form of the question. See id. On the other hand, the committee
recognized that such instructions may be the only effective way to halt unfair,
harassing or repetitious questioning. See id. Standing order 11 (a), which notes
that repeated instructions not to answer on grounds other than privilege indi-
cate that a deposition is not proceeding as it should, sets the tone for proper
conduct of depositions and makes clear that instructions not to answer ought
not to be interposed lightly. See Standing Order 11 (a), Standing Orders, supra note
160, at 351.
221. See Standing Order 12, Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 351. Stand-
ing order 12 provides as follows:
Suggestive Objections. If the objection to a question is one that can be
obviated or removed if presented at the time, the proper objection is
"objection to the form of the question." If the objection is on the
ground of privilege, the privilege shall be stated and established as pro-
vided in Standing Order 21. If the objection is on another ground, the
objection is "objection." Objections in the presence of the witness
which are used to suggest an answer to the witness are presumptively
improper.
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(3) Conferences between the witness and his attor-
ney, initiated by the witness' attorney while a question is
pending, are presumptively improper, unless initiated
for the purpose of determining whether privilege may be
asserted. 222
(4) Ordinarily, documents relating to a particular
witness ought to be produced prior to the taking of that
witness' deposition. 223 If such documents are not pro-
By limiting the nature of the objection in this way, standing order 12
reduces the chance that an objection would suggest to the witness how to an-
swer. The Special Committee provided that an attorney may explain the
grounds of his objection if the interrogating attorney so requests or if the wit-
ness is first asked to leave the room. See Eastern District Revised Report, supra note
48, at 382 (commentary to standing order 12).
Standing order 12 thus provides a straightforward solution to the problem
of suggestive objections, which is one of the most abusive tactics in deposition
practice. Some attorneys have objected to the restrictions on speaking objec-
tions as overkill, in that the rule eliminates even the most innocuous comments.
In response to this, it is suggested that an occasional "asked and answered" or
"irrelevant" accompanying an objection is, practically speaking, harmless and
unlikely to result in sanctions for violation of standing order 12. In addition, it
should be noted that the Federal Rules do not authorize speaking objections at
depositions. To permit such objections, thereby giving the objecting attorney
the option of explaining his objection and perhaps communicating sub rosa with
his client, would clearly undermine the integrity of the deposition process.
222. See Standing Order 13, Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 351. Stand-
ing order 13 provides as follows: "Conferences Between Deponent and Defending Attor-
ney. An attorney for a deponent shall not initiate a private conference with the
deponent during the actual taking of a deposition, except for the purpose of
determining whether a privilege should be asserted." Id.
The Special Committee's concern with attorney-client conferences while
questions are pending was that the answer to the question would reflect the at-
torney's testimony rather than the deponent's. See Eastern District Revised Report,
supra note 48, at 382 (commentary to standing order 13). Balanced against this
concern is the deponent's right to confer with counsel. Id. To protect the integ-
rity of the attorney-client relationship, standing order 13 permits conferences to
determine whether a claim of privilege justifies the deponent's refusal to answer
a pending question. See Standing Order 13, Standing Orders, supra note 160, at
351. Other conferences are prohibited while questions are pending, so as to
facilitate the discovery process and ensure the integrity of the deponent's testi-
mony. See id.
It is not always easy to determine when an attorney-client conference is be-
ing held for an improper purpose. If such conferences are held repeatedly in
the course of a deposition, the examiner ought to note their frequency and per-
haps seek a judicial ruling on their propriety. Eastern District Revised Report, supra
note 48, at 383 (commentary to standing order 13). It is important for the ex-
aminer to remember that the rule does not proscribe attorney-client conferences
altogether, since most conferences are initiated for bona fide purposes. See id. at
282-83. In addition, the rule does not apply to conferences initiated during
breaks in the deposition or overnight. Id. at 382.
223. See Standing Order 14, Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 351. Stand-
ing order 14 provides as follows:
Document Production At Depositions. Consistent with the requirements of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 30 and 34, a party seeking production of documents of
814 [Vol. 30: p. 767
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duced prior to the deposition, the noticing party may ad-
journ the deposition until after the documents have been
produced. 224
(5) Motions for leave to record depositions by
nonstenographic means shall presumptively be
granted.22 5
(6) Motions to take telephonic depositions of an
adverse party shall be presumptively granted. 226
another party in connection with a deposition should schedule the dep-
osition to allow for the production of the documents in advance of the
deposition. If requested documents which are discoverable are not
produced prior to the deposition, the party noticing the deposition may
either adjourn the deposition until after such documents are produced
or, without waiving the right to have access to the documents, may pro-
ceed with the deposition.
Id.
224. Standing Order 14, Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 351. For the text
of standing order 14, see supra note 223. While rule 30(b)(5) of the Federal
Rules permits document production at depositions, that process can be very
cumbersome and can delay the examination when the number of documents is
significant. Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at 383 (commentary to
standing order 14). If the examiner is reviewing the documents for the first time
at the deposition, it is difficult to maintain continuity, and time and money are
wasted. Id. Thus, the preferred procedure in the Eastern District is production
of documents in advance of the deposition. See Standing Order 14, Standing Or-
ders, supra. If that procedure is not allowed, the examination may be adjourned
until a later date without prejudice. Id.
225. Standing Order 7, Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 350. Standing
order 7 provides:
Non-Stenographic Recording of Depositions. Motions in accordance with
Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(4) for leave to record the deposition of an adverse
party or of a non-party witness by means other than stenographic re-
cording, including tape recording or videotaping, shall presumptively
be granted. If requested by one of the parties, the recording or vide-
otaping shall be transcribed.
Id. With the advances in modern technology and the enormous expense of sten-
ographically recorded depositions, there is little reason to deny a request under
rule 30(b)(4) of the Federal Rules that a deposition be non-stenographically re-
corded. Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at 379 (commentary to pro-
posed standing order 7).
226. Standing Order 8, supra note 160, at 350. Standing order 8 provides:
Telephonic Depositions. The motion of a party to take the deposition of an
adverse party by telephone will presumptively be granted. Where the
opposing party is a corporation, the term "adverse party" means an
officer, director, managing agent or corporate designee pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).
Id.
Under the Federal Rules, telephonic depositions are permissible by stipula-
tion or by court order. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(7). Telephonic depositions
have a significant potential for saving time and money, and reducing inconven-
ience to the parties and the witnesses. Eastern District Revised Report, supra note
48, at 379 (commentary to standing order 8). Therefore, the Standing Orders
provide that requests for telephonic depositions be presumptively granted. See
Standing Order 8, Standing Orders, supra.
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(7) Attendance at depositions by a party, witness
or potential witness in an action shall be permitted.2 27
(8) When an officer, director or managing agent of
a corporation or a government official is noticed for a
deposition or subpoenaed concerning a matter about
which he has no knowledge, he may file an affidavit so
stating.228 The noticing party may go forward with the
deposition of the witness, but may be ordered to pay
A major disadvantage of telephonic depositions is that the examiner cannot
observe the witness' demeanor. Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at
379 (commentary to standing order 8). If a party seeks a telephonic deposition
of an adverse party, he is essentially waiving his opportunity to observe the wit-
ness' demeanor. Id. But if a party seeks to depose a non-adverse party tele-
phonically, he is effectively depriving the adverse party of the opportunity to
observe the witness' demeanor. Id. In the latter case, standing order 8 and the
presumptive grant of the motion to take the deposition by telephone do not
apply. Id.
227. Standing Order 9, Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 350 (parties, wit-
nesses, or potential witnesses in an action "may attend the deposition of a party
or witness"). Attendance at depositions, especially by prospective witnesses or
experts, may save a party time and money. Eastern District Revised Report, supra
note 48, at 379 (commentary to standing order 9). The Special Committee
weighed efficiency against the possibility that a potential witness will tailor his
testimony based on what he heard at another witness' deposition. See id. It con-
cluded that the risk of fabrication did not outweigh the benefits to be derived
from attendance of non-witnesses at depositions. Id. Indeed, since a potential
witness has access to transcripts of testimony from previous depositions, exclud-
ing a witness from the deposition of another does little to eliminate the possibil-
ity of fabrication. Id. at 379-80.
228. Standing Order 10, Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 350. Standing
order 10 provides:
(a) Where an officer, director or managing agent of a corporation or a
government official is served with a notice of deposition or subpoena
regarding a matter about which he or she has no knowledge, he or she
may submit reasonably before the date noticed for the deposition an
affidavit to the noticing party so stating and identifying a person within
the corporation or government entity having knowledge of the subject
matter involved in the pending action.
(b) The noticing party may, notwithstanding such affidavit of the no-
ticed witness, proceed with the deposition, subject to the witness' right
to seek a protective order.
Id. This standing order is designed to eliminate the procedure of noticing depo-
sitions of high-level corporate executives or government officials with no knowl-
edge of the facts of the particular case, in order to induce a quick settlement.
Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at 380 (commentary to standing or-
der 10). The standing order provides an affidavit procedure in order to save the
time and expense of a formal motion for protective order, as would otherwise be
required under rule 26(c) of the Federal Rules. See id. at 380-81.
The Special Committee examined a related problem known as "brandying,"
which involves the noticed party producing witnesses pursuant to rule 30(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules who have no knowledge of the matters on which informa-
tion is sought. Id. at 381. The Committee acknowledged the impropriety of this
practice, but stated that the Federal Rules adequately dealt with the problem.
Id.
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costs if the witness, in fact, has no knowledge. 22 9
(9) The information to which an examining party
is entitled when a claim of privilege is interposed is set
forth in detail. 230
b. Interrogatories, Document Demands and Requests for
Admissions
The Standing Orders also set forth presumptive standards
for the conduct of written discovery. While recognizing the po-
tential for abuse of interrogatories, the Eastern District neverthe-
229. Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at 380 (commentary to
standing order 10).
230. Standing Order 21(a), Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 353. Standing
order 21(a) provides, in pertinent part, that where information is withheld in
reliance upon a claim of privilege in the course of a deposition,
the following information shall be provided during the deposition at
the time the privilege is asserted, if sought, unless divulgence of such
information would cause disclosure of privileged information:
(i) for documents, to the extent the information is readily obtain-
able from the witness being deposed or otherwise: (1) the type of doc-
ument, e.g., letter or memorandum; (2) general subject matter of the
document; (3) the date of the document; (4) such other information as
is sufficient to identify the document for a subpoena duces tecum, includ-
ing, where appropriate, the author, addressee, and any other recipient
of the document, and, where not apparent, the relationship of the au-
thor, addressee, and any other recipient to each other;
(ii) for oral communications: (1) the name of the person making
the communication and the names of persons present while the com-
munication was made and where not apparent, the relationship of the
persons present to the person making the communication; (2) the date
and place of communication; (3) the general subject matter of the
communication.
Standing Order 21 (a) (2), Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 353. For a discussion
of the objecting attorney's obligation under standing order 21 (a) to identify the
privilege being claimed, see supra note 219 and accompanying text. Standing
order 21(a) also gives the examiner further rights regarding the deponent's
claim of privilege:
After a claim of privilege has been asserted, the attorney seeking disclo-
sure shall have reasonable latitude during the deposition to question
the witness to establish other relevant information concerning the as-
sertion of the privilege, including (i) the applicability of the particular
privilege being asserted, (ii) circumstances which may constitute an ex-
emption to the assertion of the privilege, (iii) circumstances which may
result in the privilege having been waived, and (iv) circumstances which
may overcome a claim of qualified privilege.
Standing Order 2 1(a), Standing Orders, supra note 160 at 354. In arriving at these
procedures for asserting a claim of privilege at a deposition, the Special Com-
mittee balanced one party's right to obtain relevant information regarding the
claim against the other party's right to assert a privilege without "endless and
harassing inquiry about the circumstances of the assertion." Eastern Committee
District Report, supra note 48, at 390 (commentary to proposed standing order
21).
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less declined to enunciate numerical limits on interrogatories 23 1
as other districts have done.232 The following summarizes the
presumptive standards for written discovery promulgated by the
Eastern District:
(1) "Form" requests shall not be used.2 33
231. See Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at 384 (prefatory note
to proposed standing orders on interrogatories). The Committee was reluctant
to impose arbitrary limitations on the number of interrogatories that may be
propounded, since whether they are excessive really depends on the nature of
the particular claims and defenses. In some cases, fifty interrogatories may
prove too few, while in other cases five may well be too many. The Special Com-
mittee was also sensitive to the fact that interrogatories may serve as the "poor
person's deposition" and that arbitrary limits on interrogatories may severely
handicap impecunious parties in their search for justice. Id. at 383-84.
On the other hand, the Special Committee was not blind to the enormous
potential for abuse that interrogatories harbor. For analytical purposes, inter-
rogatories were classified in three categories: (1) identification interrogatories;
(2) substantive interrogatories; and (3) contention interrogatories. Id. at 384.
The Special Committee found that identification interrogatories, which are used
to elicit fairly noncontroversial information such as names of witnesses and iden-
tification of documents, are subject to the least abuse. Id. Contention interroga-
tories, however, are frequently used as instruments to harass the adversary,
especially when served at the outset of the litigation. Id. Cf Becker, supra note
86, at 441 ("The worst kind of interrogatories, although there are circumstances
where you have to resort to them, are contention interrogatories."). Similarly,
substantive interrogatories-those requesting identification or description of
events in issue-are also abused, though perhaps not as much as contention
interrogatories, by parties who answer them with self-serving statements or
laundry lists of petty objections. Id. Cf Southern District Adopts Rule to Curb Abuses
in Discovery, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 4, 1985, at 1, cols. 3-4 (Southern District of New York
has adopted the same tripartite categorization of interrogatories with the follow-
ing limitations: (1) only identification interrogatories may be served at the com-
mencement of litigation; (2) contention interrogatories may be served only at
the end of discovery unless the court orders otherwise; and (3) substantive inter-
rogatories are appropriate only if they are a more practical method of obtaining
the information than other modes of discovery).
232. For examples of local rules which do provide numerical limits on the
number of interrogatories to be propounded, see C.D. CAL. R. 8.2.1 (presump-
tive limit of 30 interrogatories); M.D. FLA. R. 3.03(a) (presumptively 50); S.D.
GA. R. 7.4 (presumptively 25); N.D. ILL. R. 9(g) (presumptively 20); D. KAN. R.
17(d) (presumptively 30); Order D.S.C. (Jan. 29, 1979) (presumptively 50). By
way of comparison, the Special Committee stated that the number of interroga-
tories be reasonably limited, given the needs of the case. Eastern District Revised
Report, supra note 48, at 384 (prefatory note to proposed standing orders on
interrogatories).
233. See Standing Orders 15, 18, Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 351-52.
Standing order 15 provides: "Form Interrogatories. Attorneys serving interrogato-
ries shall have reviewed them to ascertain that they are applicable to the facts
and contentions of the particular case. Interrogatories which are not directed to
the facts and contentions of the particular case shall not be used." Standing
Order 15, Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 351-52.
Standing order 18 provides: "Form Requests for Documents. Attorneys re-
questing documents pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 34 and 45 shall have reviewed
the request or subpoena to ascertain that it is applicable to the facts and conten-
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(2) Written discovery requests shall be drafted and
read reasonably. 234
(3) Each written discovery request shall be an-
swered fully to the extent no objection is made, and no
portion of a request shall be left unanswered merely be-
cause an objection is made to another part thereof.23 5
tions of the particular case. A request or subpoena which is not directed to the
facts and contentions of the particular case shall not be used." Standing order
18, Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 351-52. In an age of word processing and
photocopying, a lengthy set of interrogatories, document demands, or requests
for admissions can be generated in minutes at a negligible cost. Eastern District
Revised Report, supra note 48, at 386 (commentary to standing order 18). Written
discovery thus has an enormous potential for abuse, and not infrequently, par-
ties are served with form requests that have nothing to do with the subject mat-
ter of the suit. Id. at 385 (commentary to proposed standing order 15). This
practice of serving form interrogatories, document requests, or requests for ad-
missions antagonizes the adversary, impedes the discovery process, and is a
prime example of bad lawyering. Model discovery requests from previous cases
should be, and are required under the Standing Orders to be tailored to the
particular matter being litigated.
234. Standing Orders 16, 19, Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 352. Stand-
ing order 16 provides:
(a) Interrogatories shall be drafted reasonably, clearly and concisely,
be limited to matters discoverable pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b),
and shall not be duplicative or repetitious.
(b) Interrogatories shall be read reasonably in the recognition that
the attorney serving them generally does not have the information be-
ing sought and the attorney receiving them generally does have such
information or can obtain it from the client.
Standing order 16, Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 352. Standing Order 19
provides:
(a) Requests for documents and subpoenas duces tecum shall be
drafted reasonably, clearly and concisely and be limited to documents
discoverable pursuant to F.R. Civ. P. 26(b).
(b) A request for documents or subpoena duces tecum shall be read
reasonably in the recognition that the attorney serving it generally does
not have knowledge of the documents being sought and the attorney
receiving the request or subpoena generally does have such knowledge
or can obtain it from the client.
Standing Order 19, Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 352.
A major tension in written discovery is that the propounding party generally
seeks to make all-inclusive requests, while the party served construes such re-
quests as narrowly as possible. Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at
385, 387 (commentary to standing orders 16 and 19). This tension leads to
rounds of motions, which delay the progress of the case. Id. at 387 (commentary
to standing order 19). The reasonableness standard in standing orders 16 and
19 should lessen the need for posturing and gamesmanship on the part of attor-
neys during discovery. The attorneys, in addition to drafting and construing
requests reasonably, are urged to communicate directly with one another when
questions regarding the intended meaning of a request arise. Id. at 385, 387
(commentary to standing orders 16 and 19).
235. Standing Order 17, Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 352. Interroga-
tories are frequently left unanswered merely because the responding party finds
the question objectionable in part. Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at
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(4) The information to which a discovering party is
entitled when a claim of privilege is interposed is to be
set forth in detail.236
4. Sanctions
The final portion of the revised report is designed to give the
courts some guidance in imposing sanctions. The Special Com-
mittee recognized that sanctions should be imposed where man-
dated or authorized by the Federal Rules. But the Committee
also felt that the Standing Orders would minimize the need for
sanctions because the responsibilities of attorneys on discovery
are set forth in some detail. 2 37 Instead of proposing more rules
on sanctions, the Special Committee proposed factors which the
courts should take into account before imposing sanctions for dis-
covery misconduct.238 The following factors were enunciated:
1. In general, all costs of discovery abuse should
be shifted against the abusing attorney and his client. 239
Whenever costs are awarded, they should be paid
promptly.240
2. Whenever sanctions are granted under the Fed-
eral Rules, the court should consider awarding, in addi-
tion to any non-monetary sanction, reasonable expenses,
including attorneys' fees. 24'
385 (commentary to standing order 17). The Special Committee characterized
this practice of selectively ignoring proper discovery requests as an abuse. Id.
Standing order 17 makes the Committee's position crystal clear by requiring a
response to those portions of the interrogatories to which no objection is inter-
posed. Id.
236. Standing Order 21, Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 353. For a dis-
cussion of the requirements of standing order 21, see supra notes 219 & 230 and
accompanying text.
237. Eastern Committee Revised Report, supra note 48, at 391.
238. See id at 391-94 (Special Committee proposes no standing orders re-
garding sanctions for discovery abuse, but rather discusses applications of Fed-
eral Rules sanctions under the presumptive standards of conduct set forth in the
standing orders).
239. Id. at 391-92. The Special Committee suggested that the offending
party bear the cost of both the abuse and any motion to correct the abuse. See id.
The Committee also suggested that the offending attorney and his client be
jointly and severally liable for the award. Id. at 392.
240. See id. at 392. The Special Committee suggested that any "award
should be satisfied within ten days of the order directing payment." Id.
241. Id. Recognizing that attorneys' fees comprise a substantial portion of
the real cost of discovery motions, the Special Committee suggested that fees be
awarded to the prevailing party in appropriate cases. See id. This position is in
line with an overall erosion of the "American rule," under which parties pay
820 [Vol. 30: p. 767
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3. Whenever the court finds an unjustified disre-
gard of standing orders, it may enter a finding of non-
compliance against the offending counsel and his cli-
ent.242 Such a finding may result in a monetary award
covering expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees,
incurred by the abused party. 243 Findings of non-com-
pliance are not limited to wilful misconduct or bad faith,
but may extend to negligent or careless conduct. 244
4. Sanctions or findings of non-compliance should
not be imposed merely because a party has lost a discov-
ery dispute.2 45
5. Sanctions or findings of non-compliance ought
not to be imposed without affording those involved an
opportunity to have a hearing. 246 Hearings are not re-
quired, but any hearing which does take place should be
held on a written record only.2 4 7
6. When making an expense award as part of an
imposition of sanctions or a finding of non-compliance,
the court should conditionally fix the award of the party
injured by discovery abuse.248 The entry of the expense
their own attorneys' fees, and a movement toward the "English rule," under
which the prevailing party is awarded attorneys' fees. See Note, Awards of Attor-
ney's Fees in the Federal Courts, 56 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 277, 278 (1982).
242. Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at 392. Much of the discus-
sion concerning the Special Committee's initial report focused on whether viola-
tions of the proposed standing orders would give rise to sanctions. Some
members of the bar were concerned that violations of the Standing Orders
might serve as an additional basis for sanctions, perhaps unfairly penalizing and
embarrassing national practitioners. Transcript of Hearing before Special Com-
mittee on Effective Discovery in Civil Cases for the Eastern District of New York
13-15 (Nov. 17, 1983) (testimony of Sheldon Elsen). The Special Committee
was sensitive to this concern, but it also recognized that the Standing Orders
needed some teeth if they were to be effective. See Eastern District Revised Report,
supra note 48, at 364. To this end, the Committee suggested that a judge enter a
finding of noncompliance when standing orders have been unjustifiably disre-
garded. See id. at 392. A finding of non-compliance is not a sanction, but it may
result in cost-shifting to the transgressor or imposition of sanctions. See infra
note 243 and accompanying text.
243. Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at 392.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 393. The Special Committee recognized that many discovery
disputes involve genuine controversies in emerging areas of the law. See id.
Therefore, findings of noncompliance or impositions of sanctions merely be-
cause an attorney lost a discovery dispute would be unduly harsh. See id.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 393-94.
248. Id.
55
Cavanagh: The August 1, 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1985
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
award would be finalized ten days after entry. 249 The
purpose of making such an expense award is to avoid liti-
gation of what constitutes reasonable cost.2 50
B. The 1983 Amendments And The Eastern District Approach:
A Comparison
The Standing Orders adopted by the Eastern District provide
a distinctly different approach to the problem of discovery abuse
from that embodied in the 1983 amendments to the Federal
Rules. Whereas the 1983 amendments rely almost exclusively on
sanctions and judicial supervision of pretrial proceedings as the
mechanisms for remedying discovery abuse, the Eastern District
seeks to solve the problem by (1) a detailed code of conduct for
discovery setting forth practices which are presumptively proper
or improper; (2) prompt access to a judicial officer to resolve ex-
peditiously discovery disputes in accordance with uniform proce-
dures; and (3) sanctions, findings of non-compliance, and
expense awards to make whole the victims of discovery abuse.
Thus, while the 1983 amendments make sanctions the key
weapon in combatting discovery abuse, the Standing Orders min-
imize the need for imposition of sanctions.
Although the two approaches differ, the differences are not
irreconcilable. In fact, the key "differences" in the Eastern Dis-
trict approach may be more imagined than real. The Special
Committee's revised report, while encouraging the use of magis-
trates in discovery, specifically recognizes that it would be prefer-
able to have the judge handle the tasks of formulating the
scheduling order pursuant to rule 16(b) and of resolving discov-
ery disputes in complex cases. 25 1 Many routine cases, however,
involve little discovery; hence, judicial supervision of such cases
would be unnecessary, if not wasteful. Moreover, with expanding
federal caseloads, judicial time-our most valuable natural re-
source 252 -is limited. As a practical matter, it may be impossible
249. Id. at 394.
250. Id. The Special Committee stated that the procedure for making an
expense award would rarely result in litigation "because of the continuing na-
ture of discovery, the unwillingness of many attorneys to publicly disclose their
billing practices, the elasticity of what is reasonable, and other factors." Id.
251. For a discussion of the Eastern District's position on the use of magis-
trates to resolve discovery disputes, see supra notes 178-96 and accompanying
text.
252. See Becker, Efficient Use of Judicial Resources, 43 F.R.D. 421, 422 (1967).
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for a judge personally to supervise each case.253 Recognizing
these practical limitations, the Standing Orders simply offer the
judge flexibility in managing his caseload.2 54 Indeed the Stand-
ing Orders do not require reference of pretrial matters to magis-
trates, but merely give the judge the option to do so. 255 It would
appear that even judges outside the Eastern District may well be
forced, because of time constraints, to refer routine discovery dis-
putes to magistrates.
In addition, without magistrate utilization it would be diffi-
cult to effect prompt access to ajudicial officer to resolve a discov-
ery dispute. Judges, because of their many responsibilities, have
far less time in their schedules to devote to discovery than do
magistrates. If thejudge is the only person to whom litigants may
turn for a ruling, discovery is more likely to get bogged down,
which in turn delays the entire litigation. Thus, magistrate utiliza-
tion in discovery matters is consonant with the fundamental goal
of the Federal Rules-"the just, speedy, and inexpensive determi-
nation of every action." 256
Similarly, the detailed listing within the Standing Orders of
presumptively appropriate and inappropriate conduct is in keep-
ing with the overall thrust of the Federal. Rules. The Standing
Orders fill interstitially the gaps left by the broadly drafted Fed-
eral Rules.2 57 They are thus complementary to the Federal Rules
rather than contradictory. Nor do the Standing Orders impose
additional burdens on "national practitioners" or attorneys who
do not normally practice within the Eastern District.258 The pre-
sumptive practices listed in the Standing Orders represent a mere
codification of what is widely perceived by the practicing bar as
generally appropriate or inappropriate behavior.
On the other hand, the Standing Orders may well provide a
more promising solution to the problem of discovery abuse than
do the 1983 amendments. The Standing Orders, unlike the 1983
amendments, address the fundamental problems fostered by dis-
covery abuse: delay in resolution of claims and uncapped
253. For a discussion of the feasibility of judicial management of pretrial
proceedings in every case, see supra note 180 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
255. See supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text.
256. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
257. Eastern District Revised Report, supra note 48, at 391.
258. For a discussion of the fear among practitioners that the Standing Or-
ders would impair the ability of firms to conduct a national practice, see supra
note 242 and accompanying text.
19851 823
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costs. 259 The Standing Orders deal with delay by assuring
prompt access to a judicial officer and by prescribing uniform
procedures for resolving discovery disputes.2 60 Likewise, the
Standing Orders help contain costs by streamlining motion pro-
cedures. In particular they eliminate unnecessary written motion
papers and encourage broader use of modern telecommunica-
tions, thereby obviating the necessity for full-blown in-court ap-
pearances. 261 As previously noted, the 1983 amendments do not
address these fundamental concerns.2 62 Rather, with their strong
reliance on sanctions, the Federal Rules are likely to cause further
delay in litigation and add to its overall costs, thus exacerbating
rather than solving existing discovery problems.
It is impossible to predict at this juncture whether the Stand-
ing Orders will be effective.263 A number of unanswered ques-
tions remain. Will attorneys mutually observe the Standing
Orders or will they be honored in the breach? Will the judges in
the District enforce the Standing Orders? Will judges refer mat-
ters to magistrates routinely? Will magistrates prove capable of
handling the burdens of discovery? Will judges and magistrates
make themselves available to hear discovery disputes? Will
judges and magistrates follow the uniform procedures spelled out
in the Standing Orders or will they fall into individual idiosyn-
cratic procedures? Will discovery problems be promptly de-
cided? Will use of magistrates cause judges to be inundated with
requests for reconsideration of magistrates' orders? Are addi-
tional local rules with respect to discovery necessary? Only after
some careful analysis of actual experience under the Standing Or-
ders can we even begin to answer these questions.
V. CONCLUSION
The 1983 amendments, while they represent an important
first step in dealing with the problems of discovery abuse, are not
likely to bring about a sea of change in discovery practice because
259. See Eastern District Revised Report, surpa note 48, at 364 (cost control and
prevention of dilatory discovery tactics were key goals of Special Committee in
drafting the proposed standing orders).
260. See supra notes 198-212 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 197-212 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 126-49 and accompanying text.
263. To monitor the efficiency of the Eastern District's standing orders,
Chief Judge Weinstein has appointed an Eastern District Discovery Oversight
Committee. See Standing Orders, supra note 160, at 342 (ChiefJudge Weinstein's
preface to the Standing Orders).
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they do not effectively address the underlying problems in discov-
ery and rely too heavily on sanctions, a tool which simply has not
worked in the past. However, when fleshed out by a complemen-
tary set of local rules or guidelines detailing what is expected
from attorneys in conducting discovery, the 1983 amendments do
have some promise of effectuating fundamental attitudinal
changes among practitioners. The work of the Eastern District's
Special Discovery Committee may serve as a model for other dis-
tricts seeking to combat discovery abuse. The experience of the
Eastern District under the Standing Orders ought to be closely
monitored. Neither the 1983 amendments nor the Standing Or-
ders are a panacea. They will bring about meaningful change
only if attorneys, their clients and the courts truly want them to
work.
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